

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
6	1	10/16/1972	Newsletter	Newsletter from Harry J. Cooper to members of the Lion's Club encouraging them to vote for RN for re-election. 1pg.
6	1	10/16/1972	Newsletter	Newsletter from Harry J. Cooper to members of the Lion's Club encouraging them to vote for RN for re-election. 3pgs - Not scanned (duplicates)
6	1	05/05/1969	Letter	Letter from Alfred W. Stoll (Whittier College Associates) to RN RE: maintaining better lines of communication and further suggestions thereof. 1pg.
6	1	n.d.	Other Document	Business reply card from Alumni Office, Whittier College labeled "Suggestions for Whittier College Associates." 1pg.
6	1	03/20/1969	Report	Meeting minutes submitted by Darrell W. Ryan from Whittier College Associates Board of Directors Meeting. 2pgs.
6	1	05/13/1969	Letter	Letter from Alfred W. Stoll to RN thanking him for a \$500.00 contribution. 1pg.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
6	1	04/26/1971	Letter	Letter from Don Vaupel to RN congratulating him as a 10-year Whittier College Associate. 1pg.
6	1	04/23/1971	Brochure	Whittier College Recognition Banquet brochure listing Ten Year Associates including RN. 2pgs.
6	1	09/30/1974	Memo	Memo from Sandy Fox to Marje RE: mentioning an attachment to Rose. 1pg.
6	1	09/04/1973	Memo	Teletyped memo from Ron Ziegler RE: recent Jack Anderson column indicating President upset with care of his aunt. 1pg.
6	1	09/04/1973	Memo	Teletyped memo from Rose Mary Woods RE: Anderson column indicating President disturbed with care of Mrs. Timberlake is without foundation. 1pg.
6	1	08/15/1968	Memo	Memo (author unk) to RN RE: preparing for the post-election transition. 30pgs
6	1	n.d.	Memo	Memo (author unk) to RN RE: dealing with old administration. 18pgs.



HARRY J. COOPER, JR.
68 FLORENCE ROAD
RIVERSIDE, CONN. 06878

Let's Keep A Lion In The White House



Seven years ago, when I was District Governor, I inducted into membership in my New York Host Lions Club a fellow Lion who three years later was elected to our nation's highest public office. It was Richard M. Nixon.

Our President first joined Lions International in 1959 as a member of the Washington Host Lions Club. In Miami in 1963 and in Los Angeles in 1965 he addressed our International Convention and those of you who heard his messages then, know his true feelings about the important things Lionism stands for. He believes in and supports our great community service programs.

Next month, Lion Richard Nixon is seeking re-election to the Presidency. He has regained international respect for America. He has brought great dignity and prestige to the office of President. He is deeply committed to the first object of Lions International - "to create and foster a spirit of generous consideration among the peoples of the world."

Now, more than ever we need a Lion in the White House.

We have a great President and you and the other members of your Lions Club can help to re-elect him on November 7th. He deserves our complete support.

Most sincerely,

Harry J. Cooper,
Past District Governor
Lions International.

Oct. 16, 1972



Formed
for the
Advancement
of
Whittier
College
Whittier,
California

WHITTIER COLLEGE ASSOCIATES

WHITTIER COLLEGE • WHITTIER, CALIFORNIA, OXBOW 3-0771, EXT. 26

File

sent

President Richard M. Nixon
White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear President Nixon:

We believe communication is the key that unlocks the channels of understanding, involvement, and personal interest -- so we're opening our own channels of communication.

RW

Enclosed are the minutes of the latest meeting of your board of directors. We are sending these, as a first step in building awareness of Associate activities and concerns which are brought to our attention. We want you to share these concerns and to feel personally related to these activities, and we're sure you share this desire.

Also we would like you to forward your suggestions on expanded communications -- from the Associates board, from students, administration, faculty -- from anyone whose opinions and activities might be of interest to you. Let us know what you would like to know and how you would like to hear about your favorite campus area. Others will share your interest I'm sure, and it will be a great help to us as we open new channels of information.

A postcard is enclosed for your convenience, so why not jot down some suggestions right now? We really need your help so we can be more help to you!

Cordially yours,

Alfred W. Stoll

Alfred W. Stoll '49
President
Whittier College Associates

Enc.

AWS/ac

MINUTES
Whittier College Associates
Board of Directors Meeting
Thursday, March 20, 1969

The meeting was called to order at 7:26 p.m. following dinner in the President's Dining Room by President Al Stoll. There were 14 members present.

Dean Charles Montgomery was introduced and asked to speak to the Board about the recent Black Students' Union activities on campus. He commended President Smith and everyone involved on their high level of co-operation and understanding in handling the occurrence. He felt the demands of the BSU were reasonable, and that all of the students and Whittier College in general will benefit from the agreement reached on the demands.

The minutes of the December 5th meeting were read and accepted as corrected.

FINANCIAL REPORT

Darrell Ryan reported that although actual funds received to this point are below those of last year, if three large contributions that are being solicited are received, the project goal could still be achieved.

This year the schedule of fund mailings will be such that a contributor will not be asked to donate again within a year from the date they contributed.

Darrell said that many plaque seals were getting lost because they could not be seen attached to the Associate Membership Cards, and because the member did not realize that the seal was to be affixed to the plaque. He said action would be taken to correct this problem.

OLD BUSINESS

Membership Luncheons

Bud Jones reported that thirty-one new Associates have been gained through these luncheons, many not Alumni of Whittier. The next luncheon is scheduled within the next two weeks, and it is hoped that every Associate will bring a guest and prospective member. The luncheons are informally held in the President's Dining Room with President Paul S. Smith giving a brief insight into Whittier as it is today.

Nominating Committee

Appointed by President Stoll to serve with him on the Nominating Committee are Wayne Harvey, Bud Jones, and Myron Claxton.

NEW BUSINESS

President Stoll opened a discussion of the Board's responsibilities to the College. A general discussion developed among the Board members with an overall feeling that while financial contributions given by the Associates are of primary importance, efforts should also be made to encourage personal commitment and involvement. The feeling was equally held that it is important and necessary that the Associates be more aware of the activities and needs of Whittier. It was suggested that a representative of the Associates should act as a line of communications with the Administration to see where the Associates could best help the College. Similar exchanging of ideas between the Associate Board, the Alumni Board and the Faculty Senate might also be beneficial.

A committee served by Cal Callicott, Richard Spaulding, Wayne Harvey, and Al Davidson was formed to further explore ideas on strengthening the communication lines between the College and the Associates, and how the Associates could best benefit the College, the Alumni and the community.


Applauding the Associates' desires to be involved in helping the College other than financially, Dean Montgomery made a request that fifty families be found who would serve as **host** families for the Whittier College foreign students next Fall.

A motion was made by Wayne Harvey and seconded to send a copy of the Board Minutes of this meeting to all Associate members with a cover letter from President Stoll as an initial step to keeping them informed of the activities of the Board of Directors and to foster an increased participation and interest in the organization.

The next meeting of the Whittier College Associate Board will be early in June at Newport.

This meeting of the Whittier College Associates was adjourned at 9:20 p.m.

Respectfully submitted,



Darrell W. Ryan
Secretary-Treasurer



Formed
for the
Advancement
of
Whittier
College
Whittier,
California

By
WHITTIER COLLEGE ASSOCIATES

WHITTIER COLLEGE • WHITTIER, CALIF. 90608. OXBOW 3-0771, EXT. 221

May 13, 1969

President Richard M. Nixon
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington D.C. 20006

Dear President Nixon:

A sincere thank you for joining the Whittier College Associates with your generous contribution of \$500.00 to our College.

The private college today needs the support of concerned individuals such as you in order to successfully fulfill its potential to develop the individual and to promote understanding and the advancement of our society.

Your financial support, an investment in the future and development of Whittier College, signifies a faith in today's independent private education.

Again, we thank you.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Alfred W. Stoll '49".

Alfred W. Stoll '49
President
Whittier College Associates

AWS/ac



Formed
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of
Whittier
College
Whittier,
California

WHITTIER COLLEGE ASSOCIATES

WHITTIER COLLEGE • WHITTIER, CALIF. 90608. OXBOW 3-0771. EXT. 221

April 26, 1971

file

President Richard M. Nixon
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear President Nixon:

It is a distinct personal pleasure and privilege for me to congratulate you as a 10-year Associate. Your continuing commitment to Whittier College is significant in the ongoing development of this fine college. Enclosed is a souvenir copy of the program for the 1st Annual Recognition Banquet on April 23 where you were honored. Also enclosed is a 10-year button which goes in the upper right hand corner of your Associate Plaque.

Thanks again for your generous assistance in helping Whittier continue the outstanding quality of education which has come to be associated with this excellent college.

Sincerely,

Don Vaupel


Don Vaupel
President
Whittier College Associates

DV:lt

WHITTIER  COLLEGE

Recognition Banquet

April 23, 1971



Ten Year Associates

Mr. and Mrs. Marvin Agee
Mrs. Bewley Allen
Mr. Cecil Baker
Mr. and Mrs. Kenneth Ball
Mr. John S. Barnett
Mr. and Mrs. John P. Bertram
Mr. and Mrs. Gene Bishop
Mr. and Mrs. Roscoe Buckner
Mr. and Mrs. Norfleet Callicott
Mr. James Carlisle
Mr. and Mrs. John Robert Cauffman
Mr. and Mrs. J. Robert Clift
Miss Loretta Cook
Dr. and Mrs. Charles Cooper
Mr. Joseph P. Cosand
Dr. James L. Cushingam
Mr. and Mrs. Richard H. Deihl
Mr. and Mrs. Everett Dietrick
Mr. Charles H. Dillon
Mr. and Mrs. Charles F. Eckels
Mr. Lester K. Gates
Mr. J. Robert Gibbs
Mr. and Mrs. Wood Glover
Mr. Max Goldman

Judge and Mrs. Edward Guirado
Mr. and Mrs. Morgan Halvorson
Mr. and Mrs. Clinton O. Harris
Mr. and Mrs. Wayne Harvey
Mr. and Mrs. Joseph G. Hernandez
Mr. and Mrs. William Hockett
Mr. and Mrs. Douglas Houghton
Dr. and Mrs. Howard P. House
Dr. and Mrs. William Jones
Mr. John E. Kelly
Mr. and Mrs. Charles B. Kemp
Mr. and Mrs. Robert M. Kennedy
Mr. and Mrs. William F. Krueger, Jr.
Mrs. Edmund Laport
Mr. and Mrs. J. Albert Larson
Mr. and Mrs. William M. Lasseben, Jr.
Mr. and Mrs. Albert E. Madden
Mr. and Mrs. Eugene Marrs
Dr. and Mrs. Max McPherson
Miss Betty Merritt
Mrs. Jean B. Miller
Mr. and Mrs. Tolbert Moorhead
Mr. and Mrs. John A. Murdy III

Pres. Richard M. Nixon
Mr. and Mrs. John L. Pearson
Miss Marion Plummer
Mr. and Mrs. Edwin Pressey
Dr. and Mrs. Carl L. Randolph
Mrs. James V. Robinson
Dr. and Mrs. Homer Rosenberger
Mr. and Mrs. Donald E. Shively
Mr. Mynatt Smith
Mr. and Mrs. William F. Soeberg
Mr. Richard Spaulding
Mr. and Mrs. Alfred E. Stoll
Mr. and Mrs. Donald F. Stone
Mrs. Allan T. Stover
Mr. and Mrs. Thurston E. Sydnor
Dr. and Mrs. Herbert Tebbetts
Dr. and Mrs. Robert R. Thompson
Dr. and Mrs. Clifford Thyberg
Mr. and Mrs. Allen R. Tomlinson
Mrs. George E. Trotter, Jr.
Mr. Wallace R. Turner
Mr. Dwight L. Williams
Mr. and Mrs. Sam Yocum

Whittier College FELLOWS

The Ahmanson Foundation
Dr. and Mrs. Carlos Bailey, Jr.
Mr. and Mrs. Kenneth L. Ball
Bank of America Foundation
Baumholder American Community
Scholarship Association
Dr. and Mrs. Frederick M. Binder
Mr. and Mrs. Donald C. Bishop
Mr. and Mrs. Gene Bishop
California Community Foundation
California Congress of Parents &
Teachers, Inc.
Senior Class of 1971
Mr. and Mrs. J. Robert Clift
Mr. and Mrs. Richard H. Deihl
Mr. and Mrs. Ray Dezember
1195 Club

Mr. and Mrs. Malcolm Farmer
Mr. Leonard K. Firestone
Firestone Tire & Rubber Company
Ford Motor Company
Mr. C. Raymond Galbraith
Getty Oil Company
Mr. and Mrs. Clinton O. Harris
Dr. and Mrs. Richard Harvey
Hawaiian Trust Company, Ltd.
Helm Higher Education for Los Angeles
Minorities, Inc.
Miss Mabel Hodson
Hughes Tool Co./Aircraft Division
Kaiser Steel Corporation
Mrs. Emma C. Lautrup
Leach Corporation/Relay Division

The Honorable John A. Murdy, Jr.
Dr. W. Roy Newsom
Quaker City Federal Savings & Loan
Association
Rotary Club of Whittier
The S and H Foundation
Mr. J. Stanley Sanders
Mr. and Mrs. Peter Sharpless
Mr. Richard H. Spaulding
John and Beverly Stauffer Foundation
Mr. Richard A. Thomson
U. S. Borax & Chemical Corporation
Dr. F. William Wagner, Jr.
Mr. Richard D. Willett
Sam Yocum, Inc.
Mr. Anthony T. Zee

BENEFACTORS

The Daily News
The John and Dora Haynes Foundation
PepsiCo Foundation
The Sears Roebuck Foundation
Southern California Edison Company
Southern Pacific Foundation

PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL

Mr. and Mrs. T. H. Clements
William Randolph Hearst Foundation
Mr. J. Robert Jordan
George H. Mayr Educational Foundation
Mr. and Mrs. J. D. Robinson
Dr. and Mrs. Homer G. Rosenberger
Dr. John Stauffer
Woman's Auxiliary of Whittier College

NAME: Sanford Fox
ADDRESS: 6579 Braddock Road
Alexandria, Va. 22312

REQUESTED BY: Sandy Fox

RN
INSCRIPTION



^{from}
SANFORD L FOX

9/30/74

TO

Marje —

I mentioned
the attached to
Rose — for some
future time.

Many thanks,
Sandy

EXECUTIVE

PP5

The White House
Washington

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PMS RON ZIEGLER PRESS SECRETARY, DLR

WHITEHOUSE

WASHINGTON DC 20500

RECENT JACK ANDERSON COLUMN INDICATING PRESIDENT UPSET WITH

OUR CARE OF HIS AUNT TOTALLY FALSE AS FAR AS WE KNOW AND WE

ARE REFUTING UNLESS YOU ADVISE US OTHERWISE. I SOUGHT YOUR COUNSEL

BY PHONE

TRAVIS CROSS 213-577-0111 OR 799-7642

J

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The White House
Washington



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PMS ROSEMARY WOODS, DLR

WHITEHOUSE DC 20500

RECENT JACK ANDERSON COLUMN INDICATING PRESIDENT DISTURBS WITH
OUR CARE OF MRS^s TIMBERLAKE IS WITHOUT FOUNDATION AS FAR AS WE
KNOW. AM PERPLEXED HOW BEST TO HANDLE FROM YOUR STAND POINT
AND OURS

TRAVIS CROSS 213-577-0111 OR 799-7642

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FORM 0805 PRINTED BY THE STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY, U. S. A.

August 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NIXON

PREPARING FOR THE POST-ELECTION TRANSITION

Until November, you will be preoccupied with winning the election. A few steps taken now, however, can give you a headstart on meeting the wholly different, and almost impossible, demands that face a President-elect.

There are only ten-plus weeks between election and Inauguration. Within that period, and in many cases within the first few weeks of it, you will face some of your most crucial decisions.

First, you will have to make a few dozen top appointments. You will entrust the nation's fate and your own place in history to men you may not know, after a selection process necessarily less thorough than that of any professional firm, business organization, or university.

Second, you must initiate the alterations in government organization most critical for your objectives.

Third, you must formulate the substantive positions necessary to make best use of the "honeymoon period," to engage the enthusiasms of a divided nation, and to deal with early crises.

The quality of your administration may be determined in the ten weeks before you take office.

Advance preparations are therefore imperative. But there are two problems. First, you and your immediate staff must give top priority to the campaign. Second, advance preparations might be misunderstood as overconfidence of victory. (There would be little risk of such misunderstanding if it were known that both major candidates were undertaking advance preparations.) Both problems can be overcome if you entrust these preparations to discreet and trusted personal advisers not immersed in the campaign.

The four areas requiring advance work are personnel, substantive program, government organization, and transitional arrangements.

I We recommend that you now ask at least one person to begin identifying possible appointees for specific key positions. If his activities are to be of real use to you, a personnel adviser must enjoy your complete trust. He should have a wide circle of acquaintances and possess good judgment about people and about the qualities needed for effective government service. In addition, he must understand the particular qualities demanded by particular positions. He must be known to be a man of great integrity with no tendency to "play favorites." Hopefully, he would be intimate enough so that you and he could discuss specific individuals in candid detail. He ought also to enjoy the full confidence of your staff.

It should be understood by the adviser and by any others who might learn of his activities that he does not select, but only gathers names

and information for you. This adviser might or might not be useful in the post-election period when you may wish to entrust larger scale recruitment to a different person, possibly one now more actively engaged in your campaign. Two or three pre-election advisers, acting separately, might be equally or even more useful. We describe in a later section those key appointments which require decisions almost immediately after the election. If you undertake this preliminary effort, you will be much better prepared for that ordeal.

II We recommend that you request substantive studies on issues which may be in crisis during the first three to six months of 1969, issues likely to demand some early response from your administration, and issues otherwise likely to be important in your first year program, particularly those to be stressed in your Inaugural Address and other early messages. To some extent, the campaign apparatus is now doing this, but additional steps outside the campaign effort may be vital for three reasons: First, there are issues which may be important to you as President, but which are not important campaign issues. Second, campaign priorities usually preclude the pursuit of issues in sufficient depth or concreteness to provide for specific executive actions or legislative proposals. Third, such an effort might enlist participants or consultants who would not be available for the campaign itself. It is difficult to identify the issues worthy of special pre-election inquiry, but we offer some suggestions in a later section.

III We recommend that you solicit selected studies on government organization. The success of your administration in carrying out your

policies will depend primarily on the quality of people selected. The division of responsibilities among executive departments and between the departments and the White House Staff could, however, influence your choices for particular posts. You may need to determine how you expect to handle national security policy or welfare-urban-labor-transportation problems even before you make your major Cabinet and Staff appointments. Your personal preferences and working habits will determine the kind of White House Staff that would best serve you and would bear strongly on the other questions as well. You will have little time to pursue or even discuss these questions before the election, but prior staff work in these three areas at least (national security, urban problems, White House Staff) should facilitate the actions you must take immediately after November 5. You might, for example, wish to ask a man experienced in each area to recommend sensible approaches that could be implemented within existing statutory authority and thus be of immediate relevance to you. We offer further observations later.

IV We recommend that prior to the election you prepare administrative arrangements for the transition period. You will need someone to deal with the old administration after the election, or, if President Johnson suggests it, earlier. You and your appointees will also need advice on useful past transition experiences and on methods of moving smoothly and efficiently into power. These are clearly temporary functions. More generally, you will need staff services other than those required during the campaign and similar to those you will soon need in the White House. We would be prepared to offer suggestions in a later memorandum.

APPOINTMENTS

1. An impossible task. In the brief period between election and inauguration, you will have to select most of the several hundred top-level appointees upon whom the fate of your administration will largely depend. No President-elect can know beforehand more than a handful of men qualified for these posts. Many of those he chooses will be strangers. The number of appointments to be made, coupled with the shortness of time, impairs the selection process. Further complicating the President-elect's almost impossible task is pressure to reward faithful service to campaign or party. The authors--who have never felt the heat--believe that the dissatisfaction of disappointed office-seekers and their supporters are transient and minor compared to the harm to the country, and to the President, resulting from appointees of modest competence or mere acceptability. The next President's responsibilities are too grave to be entrusted either to the bureaucracy or to the merely competent.

A. Large Scale Talent Hunt

2. You will need a large-scale talent hunt primarily for the several hundred sub-Cabinet posts you must fill. For your Cabinet, you will probably draw on your intimate advisers and other major political figures. These sources in turn may suggest to you people whom you will want to use, but whom you may know casually, if at all. It may be instructive to

recall that the original Cabinets of your predecessors included men not at all well-known to the President-elect. (Rusk, McNamara, and Day fall into this category among Kennedy's 1960 appointees, George Humphrey is the obvious example in Eisenhower's 1952 Cabinet.)

A well-conducted pre-and post-election talent hunt could turn up prospects for Cabinet as well as sub-Cabinet posts. Its major targets, however, would be potential sub-Cabinet Presidential appointees. In addition, your Cabinet and Agency heads might find the results of this research of use to them in making their own important personnel selections.

3. A committee. Unless you have available an ideal recruitment chief, you might proceed by appointing a small screening committee. This method offers the advantages of multiple sources and multiple evaluations.

You might think in terms of three to five men of roughly equal stature. Elder statesmen beyond personal ambition would be useful, but they may be somewhat out of touch with younger generations. But also sufficiently beyond ambition for these purposes are many persons established in secure and relatively prestigious positions (such as a substantial industrialist or financier; senior professor, or leading partner in a major law firm). Your adviser or advisers--whether or not a committee is used--need a wide personal acquaintance in industry, finance, the professions, government, universities, etc.

You may wish to instruct your personnel advisers to consider not only registered Republicans but also qualified independents and even Democrats. (It is particularly important not to insist unduly on political

credentials for younger persons, lest the opportunity be lost--as in 1953-1960--to draw new vitality into the party.) They should seek not only the more senior people who would be appropriate Presidential appointees but the younger men who might be their deputies and assistants, or who might be useful later in the administration.

The places to look are many. Among the more obvious sources are (1) foundations, (2) boards of directors of national companies (and especially of the insurance companies that often expend considerable effort to secure broadly qualified and public spirited national representation), (3) metropolitan law firms, (4) major investment banking firms and other financial institutions, (5) universities, and (6) such business organizations as the Committee for Economic Development. The latter may be of particular aid in identifying able middle-level corporate executives.

B. Seminars with Prospective Appointees

4. The traditional method by which Presidents-elect have selected appointees has been the private interview. In some instances, your interests could also be served by arranging for a few seminars to be conducted by small groups, including some possible appointees.

The format of such seminars should not be uniform. To one on domestic and international financial matters, three to six men might be invited; most would be "experts" in the sense of having qualifications for appointment to the Treasury, Commerce, or the Council of Economic Advisers. They could receive invitations and be given agenda a week or so in advance. In an hour or two with such a group, you could inform yourself on complex,

technical subjects, and at the same time obtain impressions of how these men might perform as members of your administration.

In a less technical area, you might alternatively invite a few possible appointees to join you in a briefing session conducted by representatives of the departing administration. You could find it profitable to see how these men interact with experts and with each other. This device is available before the election as well as later, and it could both extend the range of your knowledge and spare you some fruitless private interviews.

C. Appointment Priorities

5. Earlier the better. To be ready to operate the government upon its inauguration, the new administration must be formed as much before January 20 as possible. The new appointees need time to familiarize themselves with the fundamentals of their offices before assuming actual responsibilities, to get to know one another, to extricate themselves from their previous occupations, and to make the necessary personal moves. Although it was once customary to announce the Cabinet on Inauguration Day, major appointments should now be made as soon as possible after the election. We have divided appointments into "immediate" and "less-immediate" categories and arbitrarily placed the dividing line at fifteen days after the election. All major appointments should be completed by mid-December.

6. Superior positions first. It is generally preferable to name a department's Secretary before naming its Assistant Secretaries. This might seem obvious, but President Kennedy tried the opposite in order to "plant his own men" in the departments and thus provide alternative

channels to the departments. The Kennedy effort did not accomplish that purpose but tended to impair effective working relationships within the departments; the Secretary's position was made ambiguous both with respect to his nominal subordinates and with respect to the White House. That is not the way to make the departments effective entities (and especially not in State with its chronic organizational difficulties). The President-elect should, of course, participate in selecting major departmental appointees--especially the Deputy or Undersecretary. But we believe he will achieve a more effective administration if he accords the Secretary-designate some role in this process.

7. Criteria for immediate appointments. Before naming the positions that should be filled immediately--a list that is meant to be suggestive rather than definitive--we enumerate some relevant criteria. Prompt appointment seems required for positions with one or more of the following characteristics:

(1) The agency is concerned with matters in which decisions are required and in which wrong decisions may have disastrous consequences. Here the appointee must be given the utmost time to prepare. (State, Defense, and perhaps Justice)

(2) The agency is so complex, so ill-organized, or so poorly staffed--or all of these--that successful mastery by the new administration requires the longest possible preparation. (State, Defense, and, depending on your plans, HEW, HUD, or Transportation)

(3) For these or other reasons, early preparation must be undertaken by second and third level Presidential appointees whose appointment

requires some attention from a Secretary-designate.

(4) The agency is likely to be confronted by early urgent demands for executive action or legislative recommendations such that concrete agency preparations must begin at once. (Treasury and others)

(5) The position is so prestigious or of such controversial policy importance that the leading political figures in the party are regarded as contenders. Until such positions are assigned, the President-elect will have difficulty obtaining impartial advice regarding the many other posts he must fill.

(6) The position requires early appointment for psychological or symbolic reasons. (UN Ambassador)

8. Early staff appointments. Your own staff needs for the transition period must be attended to. Summarizing matters of great complexity, we would suggest that you will need one assistant or more for each of nine functions. Since you will require permanent White House Staff to handle all but two of these functions, you might appoint to your transition staff men whom you are considering using in the same roles after January 20. The transition period can then give you an opportunity to find out in advance whether they have the special capacities needed to help you carry your post-Inauguration responsibilities. The functions to be performed for you both during the transition and later are:

a) Management of your calendar and of administrative arrangements for yourself and your staff. This could be your permanent Appointments Secretary.

b) Contact with the press and advice on public relations. One

man usually performs both functions and he could become your permanent Press Secretary.

c) National security liaison and advice--a role similar to that performed by Rostow for Johnson, Bundy for Kennedy, and Gray and Goodpaster for Eisenhower.

d) Liaison for and "translation" of military and intelligence documents.

e) Personnel advice. There might be need for two persons: one concerned with the general talent hunt and the other handling patronage recommendations.

f) Oversight of task forces and similar substantive work. This might be done by a general aide for policy and programs--by a man with the breadth of jurisdiction (though not necessarily the powers) of a Sherman Adams or Theodore Sorensen. This function could be divided among several men who would also collect ideas and prepare initial drafts of your Inaugural Address and later public messages. Actual assignments depend, of course, on many factors including the distribution of literary talent.

g) Special contact for Senators and Congressmen. This could be done by your permanent Congressional liaison assistant(s).

The following functions need to be performed only during the transition and for a short time thereafter. You might assign them to men whose wisdom you want but who, because of business commitments, age, health, or some other reason, will not accept long-term appointments.

h) Advice on organization and reorganization.

1) Advice on transition questions and transition contact with the old administration.

Among decisions which you will have to work out before or during the transition period will be some regarding organization of your White House Staff. You will have to determine how much access each assistant is to have and, for example, whether there is to be a staff coordinator like Adams. You will have to decide whether your best interests will be served by giving each assistant a strict functional assignment or by using them to some extent interchangeably. Since the purpose of the White House Staff is to give the President the extra eyes, ears, and hands he needs for his incredibly difficult task, your decisions on these questions and others related to them could have profound effects on your presidency. We hope to describe the issues in greater detail in a subsequent memorandum.

9. Early appointments in the national security area. Most of the following positions meet several criteria for early appointment: *

a) Secretary of State and two Undersecretaries. The qualities you seek will depend in part on your conception of his office. See Par. 21 below. **

* Lest we presumptuously state the obvious, we relegate to the footnotes our limited observations on the qualities needed for certain offices.

** Also, we believe it important that the top team in State have the capacity to advise the President, to guide the Department, to deal with friends and critics in Congress, and generally to explain administration policies in ways that will maximize public understanding and support. Dulles, Herter, and Rusk each possessed some of these qualities, but the lack of confidence, communication, and team spirit at the top level of the Kennedy-Johnson State Department is not a happy precedent.

b) Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary. ***

c) Central Intelligence Agency Director. If you intend to appoint a new Director during your first few months, he should be appointed early. You might wish to continue Mr. Helms, who is a CIA official with, we understand, an excellent reputation. That course requires no immediate action; you would simply have to ask him sometime before Christmas to stay on and to announce that fact. (Either an indefinite reappointment or a commitment of six months or so would seem courteous in such a case.)

d) Ambassador to the United Nations. If you wish to continue the symbolic importance of this position and to fill it with a prominent figure, then the appointee will have to be named about the same time as the other high national security officials.

e) The JCS. The terms of both General Wheeler, the Chairman, and General McConnell, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, will expire in 1969. Following the precedent set by President Eisenhower, you could indicate before Inauguration, or even in November, your choices for these posts, or you could defer action. Your decisions both on individuals and on timing will require careful consideration. These decisions will be taken as indicative of many of your policies. They will also be read as suggestive of your basic attitude toward the military establishment and can influence the amount of cooperation you and your appointees

*** The prescription is easy to state: judgment and wisdom plus Clifford's reputed ability to deal with both the Congress and the JCS and McNamara's reputed analytical ability.

obtain from the inner reaches of the Pentagon. Many complex issues are involved, especially if, as a result of your decisions on Vietnam, or for other reasons, you were to contemplate asking the other two chiefs to step down or to take other posts. (Admiral Moorer's term as Chief of Naval Operations runs to 1971; General Westmoreland's as Chief of Staff of the Army to 1972.) We are prepared to submit an additional memorandum on this subject.

f) The field commander in Vietnam? We raise the question because reconfirmation or replacement might have significant effects in Saigon or Paris and on your concepts for the conduct of the war within Vietnam.

10. Early appointments in foreign operations.

a) The Ambassador to Moscow is an important bridge between the two governments. Not only are his functions important, but he may also be a symbol to the Russians of your administration's prospective attitudes. Moscow is no place for an inexperienced academic or other amateur. Unless early inquiries persuade you otherwise, you will want to consider reconfirming the present ambassador as a symbol of continuity. If there is to be a change, the new appointee must be highly qualified. In any event, an early announcement would be desirable to permit the new appointee to consult fully with his predecessor.

b) Ambassador to Saigon. This post will remain important for the foreseeable future. If you intend to continue the incumbent, it could be wise to announce it early to preserve his effectiveness in Saigon. If you make a change--perhaps necessary as a symbol of the popular mandate

for change in Vietnam policy--the successor should have a maximum time to prepare.

c) Paris negotiating team with North Vietnam. Your actions here will appear to signal the direction of your policies toward the negotiations and the war. You will want to consider with your Vietnam experts the appropriateness or manner of changing the Paris team. If you continue them for the near future as a symbol of a continued "tough" negotiating position (if that would be its meaning), it would be advisable to announce your decision quickly.

d) Ambassador to Paris. The country is important to us, but its government is so highly sensitive and difficult to deal with that an early appointment is advisable.

e) Ambassadors at large. These positions, as such, do not require immediate attention unless you have particular functions in mind.

f) Most other ambassadorships can probably be deferred until after Inauguration in favor of more pressing work. A few caveats are, however, in order: (1) The State Department's views on the relative urgency of other positions should be considered. Bonn and Tokyo, for example, might be thought to require early attention, as might London, Prague, Warsaw, Rio, or the special ambassadors to NATO and the OAS. (2) The governments not receiving immediate attention may feel slighted and undervalued by the United States. To preserve feelings, you might dispatch special envoys to explain the delay and give assurances of our interest. (3) Most ambassadors would be asked to continue (i) indefinitely,

(ii) for a few months, or (iii) briefly. This will present few problems for career officials who would stay or for political hacks who won't be missed. Others may require gentle treatment if you wish them to remain.

(4) The longer such posts remain unfilled, the greater will be the pressure for political appointments. Your Secretary of State-designate could form an advisory committee to identify the ambassadors who should be dropped quickly (former political appointees of modest quality), those who should be retained (the best career people and those non-career ambassadors who have served with unusual distinction), and to screen names proposed for vacated posts.

11. Early "domestic" appointments.

a) Budget Director. This agency's name does not connote the breadth of qualities required by the office. The Budget Bureau and the White House Staff provide the President's principal protection against departmental and congressional special pleading. Only with their help can he make the executive apparatus serve his purposes. The Budget Director should be the one man in government with an outlook virtually as broad as that of the President, and he must be able to judge not only costs but also relative importance among competing programs. The office needs a man of wisdom and vision with understanding of many policy issues. Though no particular professional background is vital, all testimony we have taken suggests that economists have proved unusually effective in this post. An early appointment is crucial to master the current budget and to gain early use of the invaluable resources of the Budget Bureau.

b) Secretary of the Treasury.* It is likely that the problems of balance of payments, taxation, and the general state of the economy will argue for a November appointment. If the economic front is quiet, however, it may be possible to delay this appointment until December.

c) Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors. This post should be filled early if the Treasury is. The Department is a powerful agency and its Secretary has tended to consider himself the President's primary economic adviser. In any case, it may be useful to have the Chairman of the CEA at hand from the beginning.

d) Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and/or Secretary of Housing and Urban Affairs.** The new administration has two problems in this area: it will encounter strong demands for action and legislative recommendations to deal with the "urban crisis." Because it is important

* A Republican administration enjoys the presumptive confidence of the financial community. Thus, your appointment need not be specially directed to assuring them. But a different audience may need reassurance: your appointee should not only understand compensatory fiscal policy; he should be able to speak the language and perhaps even appeal to the economists and economic critics who do most of the popular and serious writing in this area and who thus tend to shape the general reception of an administration's economic program--often in the long-run as well as the short. This "criterion" is almost certain to be satisfied by your CEA Chairman.

** These are critical agencies for the new administration. This is the area of key and explosive domestic challenges with the least assurance of "solution" in principle or legislation in practice. Innovations are necessary, but innovations (e.g., the "negative income tax") may be costly and irreversible even though experience or later analysis may prove them unwise. Yet, the pressure for action from politics and "the streets" will be enormous. And it is a Republican administration in particular that needs to win acceptance, trust, and confidence in this area. These agencies require at least as much attention and care as are customarily assigned to the State

to respond and because a failure to push affirmative proposals will force it into an unhappy defensive posture, the new administration must be ready to move. Secondly, a Republican President has a strong need to demonstrate concern with poverty, urban decay, and associated problems. An early appointment could dramatize your concern. Certain outstanding appointments could induce opposition critics to "wait and see" and to give the administration a chance "to prove itself." And the earlier the appointments are made, the sooner you can begin to ask your administration for results.

e) Secretary of Agriculture. There seems to have been a sweeping partisan turnover of Agriculture personnel in 1961. If similar turnover is to occur in 1969, the Secretary should be appointed early to allow time for departmental recruiting and orientation.

12. Other appointments.

a) Attorney General.* He is involved in matters that are intrinsically and politically of great importance: civil rights, criminal

and Defense appointments--and even more because the qualities required are even rarer. It will be difficult to find the men who can manage the departments, who can delegate but not too much, who can both reign and rule, who can react and appraise but who can also innovate and generate enthusiasm, who can refrain from bucking every demand up to the White House, who have sufficient idealism and clarity of purpose to demonstrate "concern" and "commitment" and indeed to push for improvement but who are also sufficient team players to accept intra-administration "defeat" without leaking all or resigning in a huff. Whether such persons exist outside of heaven, we cannot say.

* The Attorney General can be a much more important asset to an administration than is commonly realized. (1) Presidents may lament the subsequent behavior of their Supreme Court appointees without appreciating the frequent

procedure, riot control, organized crime, the FBI. The course of the campaign, in particular, may require an early appointment for symbolic purposes. Nevertheless, the Attorney General has relatively less need than, for example, the Secretary of Defense to master the technicalities of ongoing problems, or to prepare for early crises (at least if riots remain infrequent during the winter).

b) Secretary of Labor.* Appointment before Thanksgiving would

source of their problem: they relied for advice on an Attorney General who did not learn or appreciate the significance of an appointee's judicial philosophy but who relied instead on others' conclusionary appraisals of quality and political opinions. A President may have his most lasting impact through his judicial appointments (including the lower courts); the Attorney General will have a role in that process. It is important to have an Attorney General who will do you and the nation credit in that role. To do so with appropriate attention to Senatorial and other patronage requests requires great judgment and finesse. (2) The Solicitor General's office traditionally attracts brilliant talent from law firms and law schools. With appropriate leadership from the Attorney General, the Department can do the same both at the level of Presidential appointees and below. This resulting reservoir of high-powered talent can multiply the Department's effectiveness and also serve, by loan or otherwise, other departments and the White House. (3) The Attorney General's rectitude, vigilance, and readiness to inquire can give you an important defense against corruption within the government.

*This position has commonly been viewed as "labor's voice in the Cabinet." When important matters are at stake, however, union leaders want to deal with you and your representative. And, of course, neither management nor Congress will respect a mere union labor spokesman, whatever his title. To advise you, to serve as a buffer and (when appropriate) mediator on industrial relations matters, to supervise the mediation services, and to deal (as appropriate) with the National Labor Relations Board--your appointee must be tolerable to labor but probably not a union man. You might find the right man in industrial relations; among respected arbitrators, mediators, or umpires; or even in a Business School, Economics or Law faculty.

not seem necessary unless (1) there is or might be pressure for federal involvement in important national strikes in progress or prospect before March, or (2) you intend to take a very early position on "wage-push" inflation.

c) Secretary of Transportation.* Nothing inherent in this post requires that appointment be made in November rather than December.

There is a serious organizational problem on the domestic welfare front. As one interim approach, you might insist that the Secretaries of HEW, HUD, Labor, perhaps Transportation, and perhaps others form a subgroup of the Cabinet and work very closely together to formulate and implement policy. If that is to be done, it should be done from the beginning and calls for roughly simultaneous appointments. Thus, if one is appointed early, all should be. (Alternatively, if you intend to give one Secretary primary responsibility for the overlapping welfare functions of the several departments, he could be appointed early and the others late.)

* A trouble-avoiding holding operation may not be too difficult in this department. It will not be easy, however, to find a man who can promote innovation and cope with it in the effort to keep the country livable notwithstanding its expanding and increasingly-concentrated population. More common than creativity, but still rare enough to emphasize is the strength to stand up to the special interests, such as the "highway lobby" or the protagonists of the merchant marine or supersonic transports. He will also have to consider the desirability of new steps to consolidate or coordinate Executive Branch operations with those of the "independent" Civil Aeronautics Boards and Interstate Commerce Commission. Whether new steps would be both wise and politically practicable is not clear, but your appointee should be one who can both answer the question and carry out any necessary steps.

d) Postmaster General. Appointment before Thanksgiving is not required unless you must take a position in your first few months on the proposal of the recent Presidential Commission that the postal service be performed not by a regular government department but by a public corporation. If delay would impede reform, your appointee cannot begin soon enough to appraise the substantive merits and political possibilities of reform.

e) Secretary of Commerce. There is less need for appointment before December. The basic question is whether you can make something more of this post than it has been in recent decades. If you are considering merging the Labor and Commerce Departments, your appointees should be made aware of this at the time of appointment.

f) Secretary of the Interior.* Again, early action may not seem necessary.

g) White House Scientific Adviser. The "scientific community" attaches great importance to this post and became very restive about President-elect Kennedy's intentions until the post was filled in 1961. The same sensitivity can be expected today. A strong and relatively early, though not necessarily immediate, appointment can reassure this community of your respect for them and help gain their respect for your White House and thus facilitate the recruitment of top scientific talent in Defense and elsewhere.

* In addition to the usual functions, it's worth noting that the man who can cleanse our rivers, save our parks, and conserve our natural spaces in the face of growing population will make a President's place in history--and in the here-and-now as well if it doesn't cost too much. And the man who can please public and private power partisans and keep the oil and mineral interests off the President's back will be doubly precious.

h) FBI Director. Unless you are persuaded that you want Mr. Hoover to continue, judicious silence about this post should give him ample opportunity (which he might welcome in view of his age) to indicate that he does not wish reappointment. If a new appointment is to be made, it must receive the greatest care, for you cannot later remove the Director without being charged with "political misuse" of an agency that should be "above politics." For an agency long subject to single control, there is reason to appoint an outsider who could look at the Bureau with a fresh eye. At least, there should be no automatic presumption that a present Bureau official would be better than a first-rate urban police chief, an effective administrator not now in police work, or an elder statesman who could serve for a short period, reassure the public and give you a breathing spell in which to assert your control over this important but currently semi-sovereign agency. Although your Attorney General should probably have a voice in the appointment, its importance requires your close attention.

i) White House liaison with the academic community. Your two predecessors had resident academics in the White House presumably in the hope of generating a sympathetic chronicle and a bridge to "intellectuals" at large. The first function is unsure (compare Schlesinger with Goldman) and the second silly. You reach "intellectuals" not by having a special communicator for that purpose, but by the actions and statements of your administration. By all means, do not neglect academics in your operating and staff appointments. And, of course, their use in pre-

and post-Inauguration task forces is both (1) an effective and easy way to impress "intellectuals" and (2) useful on the merits.

13. Immediate action by new appointees. Many of your appointees will need time--perhaps six to eight weeks--to extricate themselves from other affairs. Even so, all appointees should be asked to begin immediately, if only on a part-time basis, not only to familiarize themselves with their new jobs, but to confer with members of the outgoing administration, meet the civil servants who will work for them, and learn the routine of their agencies.

D. Political Criteria Generally; Holdover Personnel

14. Political considerations have an inevitable place in appointments. Many excellent candidates will also enjoy excellent political credentials. But not all those with political support will be worthy of important responsibilities:

a) Though judgeships need no special caveat since everyone understands their importance, regulatory agencies do. They are often viewed as convenient "dumping grounds" for persons of minimum qualifications, the assumption being that a commission of five or seven members can carry a few weak members. Often, however, most of the members turn out to be weak. Even when this is not the case, the weak appointees vote, and not always wisely. It has reached the point where well-qualified men frequently decline to serve on regulatory commissions. To correct that situation, the new President would need to instruct his personnel recruiters in unequivocal

terms and, in order to induce a good man to join an agency, he may have to give assurances that he will fill future vacancies with men of similar high quality.

b) There are positions--often wasteful and unnecessary--of some prestige that can be filled with persons of minimum quality without undue damage to you or to the nation. A thorough (and secret) pre- and post-election attempt to identify such positions would be useful to you.

15. Some personnel and patronage advisers have, in past administrations, appeared to insist on political credentials for every Presidential appointee and for every lower position at the disposal of such appointees. Such an approach will deprive your administration of valuable services and will miss the opportunity to win independents to the Republican cause. There is obviously reason to avoid highly partisan Democrats, but independents and even nominal Democrats should be welcomed with open arms even as Presidential appointees and especially at lower levels. And if academics who supported Democrats are excluded from task forces and from consultation, an important resource will be lost.

16. Continuing old officials.

a) At least one Presidential appointee in each agency should be asked to remain for a few days after Inauguration in order to provide each department with an "Acting Secretary" to perform the formal departmental functions that cannot be performed by your appointees prior to their official Senate confirmation.

b) Some Presidential appointees in the outgoing administration are essentially career men of a quality you will wish to retain. (This is especially likely in such departmental positions as the Assistant Secretary for Administration--who will be useful for a few months at least.)

c) Some non-career officials of the outgoing administration might be of such outstanding quality that you would want them to stay. Your pre- and post-election personnel advisers should make the effort to identify any such persons.

d) The preceding considerations are applicable with even greater force to those non-Presidential appointees occupying positions that are at the disposal of the new administration.

II

SUBSTANTIVE POLICY PLANNING

17. We have refrained thus far from mentioning the Bay of Pigs, though that episode dramatizes the dangers facing an administration that takes office ill-prepared for the exercise of power. We refer to it now because it illustrates some problems almost certain to face you in your early months in office.

(1) Elements in the bureaucracy will refurbish and attempt to sell ideas studied and rejected by the previous administration or, as in the case of the Bay of Pigs plan, represent as beyond the point of no return programs about which the previous administration had, in fact, been skeptical, reserved, or undecided.

(2) Your appointees will be less willing than later to go against what seems a consensus among departmental experts. As with the Bay of Pigs plan, they may feel hesitant to express doubts. In other instances, they may hesitate to question bureaucratic advice that something or the other cannot be done.

(3) Your appointees will be less prone than later to recommend courses of action involving risks of public or Congressional criticism. With each hoping for maximum accomplishments, each will be reluctant to see you incur political costs except in behalf of his program. After six months or so, your appointees will hopefully have become not only more realistic but more conscious of how their departmental interests fit into the whole program of the administration.

18. From mere mention of these problems, several obvious conclusions emerge:

(1) Your appointees should identify as quickly as possible the hobby horses of otherwise valuable and trustworthy men in the permanent government. They should also make every effort to learn from their predecessors the exact status of issues likely to arise between January and July, 1969.

(2) Your appointees will need to acquire as much advance knowledge as possible about higher-level personnel in their agencies and about the major issues which they are apt to face in the settling-in period.

(3) To cope with the third problem, your appointees will need better understanding than has been the case in the past of what the President expects--of what you expect.

This means that you will need to make a number of early decisions about policy issues and to communicate these decisions as clearly as possible to your prospective and actual appointees. These decisions will concern not only policy positions, many of which will be developed during the campaign, but also relative priorities, tactics to be followed (i.e., a push for legislation, an effort first to stimulate public pressure, or simple administrative action), and desired timetables (e.g., some symbolic action on cities before the summer even if high priority measures have to come later).

19. With this as prologue, we suggest below some of the more obvious issues on which you might want to initiate serious pre-election study, with a view to helping you make the tough decisions on policy and tactics which you will want to make as soon as possible after November 5:

(1) A first group of issues would be those which could be in crisis in early 1969: Vietnam, Thailand, Berlin and East Europe, the Middle East, urban "ghettos," federal-state-local welfare programs, monetary policies, threats to wage-price stability, and the balance of payments.

(2) A second group consists of issues with continuing or long range ramifications requiring early decisions. This category does not admit easy definition and is perhaps better described by example. General defense and space programs, NATO, ABM, manned bombers, relations with Cuba and Red China, long-range anti-crime policies, and relations with regulatory agencies all illustrate in several ways matters upon which you may have to make early choices that will set in motion programs lasting the length of your administration.

(3) A third group of issues would be in those areas in which you plan early legislative proposals. You, of course, know what these will be; any guesswork on our part would be irrelevant.

A considerable body of experience exists with regard to task forces and how to get the most out of them. We would be happy to prepare a summary on this subject if it would be of use.

III

THE IMPORTANCE OF GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION

20. In a number of key policy areas your ability as President to formulate, coordinate, and execute programs will depend on putting into particular posts men who can do what you want the occupants of these posts to do. Given the number of high level officials that must be named soon after the election, you might usefully have some pre-election attention given to the division of responsibilities most compatible with your purposes as President. The following paragraphs will identify two major issues bearing on your prospective appointments.

A. Responsibility for National Security

21. Prior to choosing your Secretary of State, you might well consider the extent to which you will want your Secretary to be your principal adviser on all foreign policy problems, including military, financial and economic policy. This decision will affect both the qualities you will seek in a Secretary, and the breadth of charter you will assign to the National Security adviser on your own staff.

You face many alternatives, each involving complex considerations. We are prepared to develop a further memorandum on the subject.

a) Meanwhile, it is important to recognize that if you choose to give your Secretary of State a broader mandate, the consequence will be twofold: First, the Secretary-designate must be a man who wants this role and who understands what he has to do to perform it effectively. Second, the State Department would have to recruit a staff of men able to think of foreign policy not merely in terms of diplomacy, but in much broader terms.

b) If State does not perform this role, such a staff must be part of the White House or National Security Council staff under the direction of a national security adviser. Thus, resolution of this issue affects not only the requirements for a Secretary of State, but also those for your national security adviser and their personal staffs.

22. In any event, there are perennial organizational problems within the State Department which in the past have prevented it from being as useful to the President as it might be. In particular, the relationships among foreign service and non-foreign service men, the regional desks and functional bureaus, and the foreign service on the one hand and program groups such as AID on the other, need to be rationalized. The Secretary-designate must understand that you care about the efficiency of State and that he must address this problem, or at least entrust it, to an Undersecretary with genuine delegated power. You will want to be sure that your top team in State has the interests and resources to perform both the policy and the management tasks.

B. Organizing to Deal with Urban Affairs

23. The ability of the federal government to respond to urban problems is reduced by the diffusion of responsibility and power in this area among many governmental departments and agencies. No matter how much responsibility is transferred to states or localities, the federal government will remain concerned with inter-urban transportation, assistance to local police, and other forms of grants-in-aid. Moreover, the transfer of other responsibilities will require considerable study and, at best, will take time. In short, the problem will continue.

24. The major issues here are whether and to what extent federal responsibility for dealing with urban affairs should be centralized, and if so, whether the centralization should occur within the existing departmental framework, within the White House or Executive Office staff, within some other agency, or within a super-department created by merging existing departments and agencies. Any such steps would, of course, affect your personnel requirements for Justice, HUD, OEO, and White House assistant(s) primarily concerned with urban affairs.

25. If you contemplate reorganization requiring Congressional action, preliminary studies looking toward proposals for legislation might well be undertaken prior to election. And if, as you have indicated, you are to provide encouragement to the development of locally owned housing and business in black communities and to enlist private industry in efforts to rebuild the ghettos, then pre-election studies of how the White House could

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. NIXON

DEALING WITH THE OLD ADMINISTRATION

Introduction and Summary

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Yet cooperation is essential for several reasons. At least part of the public will be offended if either fails to show courtesy and consideration. National unity is hardly served by permitting a hard-fought campaign to merge into post election feuding. And, of course, much of the machinery for preparing a new President for the transfer of power can be utilized only with the concert of his predecessor. Thus it is in your interest that the interregnum be a time when old hatchets are buried and the grinding of new axes postponed.

Both because he has more to gain and because the task is easier for him, the burden of maintaining good will between Administrators falls to the President-Elect. The outgoing Administration has valuable information, experience, and

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advice that you and your team will want to tap. To make cordial advances, to overlook minor irritants, to soothe the President's wounded pride -- all these are small prices to pay for such resources.

Pre-election Period. In order to exploit fully the opportunities for an effective transfer of responsibility allowed by cooperation between the two Administrations, you should consider the following actions:

- Appoint a counterpart to President Johnson's designee, Charles Murphy, experienced in the operations of the Executive Branch and able to bargain with Murphy on equal terms.

- Ask your designee to decide upon the requests to be made of the incumbent Administration.

- Initiate planning for transition matters not directly related to relations with the old Administration.

Post-election Period. Post-election customs are clear. President Johnson will doubtless suggest an early meeting to set the tone of transitional cooperation and lay the broad outlines of the actions you will take together. In summary -- to be elaborated later -- you will want to touch the following points:

- Security clearances: You should make arrangements for expediting security clearances for your appointees.

- Current and background information: You should seek access to such Administration information as daily intelligence reports, briefings and memoranda on current problems, and appropriate "cable traffic." You should also request other information, to be described below, that may be difficult to obtain later or less valuable unless studied in advance and acted upon early.

- National security and budget cooperation: You should plan for early and close cooperation on national security affairs and the budget process.

- Orientation of appointees: You should arrange for the general orientation of your appointees: briefing of new officials by the predecessors, access to career staff and files, clerical and professional assistance, and perhaps ground-rules to be established for an "open office" policy.

I. Pre-election contacts

1. It will be very much to your advantage to accept President Johnson's invitation to begin discussions now about the transition. After Election Day you will want as much cooperation as you can get from the outgoing Administration. The more you get, the more effectively you and your appointees can govern after January 20.

You cannot ask much prior to November 5. Whomever you designate to negotiate with the Administration can, however, lay the groundwork for fulfilling your many post-election requirements.

You must first therefore choose an individual to act for you in these negotiations. President Johnson's appointee, Charles Murphy, is an affable but very tough Southerner, long experienced in Washington. He acted for Truman in the 1952-53 transition, served in Agriculture and on the C. A. B. under Kennedy and Johnson, returned to the White House recently as a Special Assistant, and reportedly represented Johnson in Chicago during the democratic Convention. Your designee must be able to deal with Murphy on equal terms. It seems essential that he possess not only personal shrewdness and bargaining abilities, but experience in the total operations of the Executive Branch, preferably in the Executive Office.

2. You should develop with your designee a catalogue of your transitional needs. For both political and administrative reasons, these will fall into three general categories: (a) services that can be performed, at least in part, by the outgoing Administration prior to November 5; (b) post-election cooperation that can be plotted and arranged prior to the election; (c) post-election services that need not, or should not, be discussed with the incumbent Administration until after the election. In subsequent sections of this memorandum, we suggest several cooperative efforts and services you may want to request and, where important, try to indicate the time when action is most usefully initiated.

3. Although not directly related to dealings with the old Administration, certain other transitional matters bear a short comment. In order to coordinate later cooperation with the Administration and to make maximum use of interregnum preparation, you should begin thinking about designees to perform two functions. First, you will need some person(s) to direct and organize your transition activities in general. This man would conceivably play much the same role as Henry Cabot Lodge did for Eisenhower in 1952-1953. Second, you may want to select a transition planner, whose task will be to perform "think work" about the transition. The services of Richard Neustadt for Kennedy in 1960-61 suggest the nature of his responsibilities.

II. The Immediate Post-Election Period

A. Meeting with the President.

4. The President will probably contact you shortly after November 5 and suggest an early meeting. In order to gain maximum lead time for the transition,

you should accept the earliest possible date. Preliminary negotiating at the staff level can settle many details of agenda and format, which then need not occupy the time of the principals.*

5. You and the President may wish to issue a joint statement after your meeting. The ideal statement would leave everything open and yet obviate any appearance of friction which might result if the President later feels compelled to emphasize that his power continues unimpaired until January 20 or if you later wish to disclaim responsibility for interregnum Executive actions. A suggestion follows:

The President and President-Elect had a full, friendly and useful discussion. They and their associates will cooperate in every appropriate way in order to insure a smooth and effective transfer of responsibility on January 20. They will continue to consult as they think desirable and are confident that such cooperation can be achieved without impairing the orderly functioning of the Executive Branch in carrying out the President's Constitutional responsibilities.

B. Principals tone shapes transition.

6. You and the President will have to take strong and positive action to surmount the impediments to effective cooperation that have traditionally characterized transitions. Many in Government will feel that they and their policies were treated unjustly during the campaign. Some new people will act as if they

* For bargaining purposes, you will want these "White House negotiators" to be aware not only of your various needs for the transition, but of their relative priority. In addition, you will want to think about the general format of the meeting. You may wish, for example, to request the presence of key members of both Presidential staffs, either for purposes of coordination or in the hope of exposing subordinates to the spirit of cooperation shown by the principals.

were already in office. New appointees have been known to assume that their predecessors were fools or scoundrels or both and to show no regard for past decisions, present reasons, or future insights. Some incumbents may attempt to "sell" their policies to the new people. And the new people may feel that they are being asked to commit themselves prematurely.

By frankly anticipating these characteristic attitudes, you can try to offset them. Hopefully, so will the retiring President who must set the example of neither preempting his successor unnecessarily nor deferring all action in critical areas. And if he, who has suffered campaign criticism, is willing to act responsibly and constructively, his subordinates can be encouraged to do the same.

You, in turn, cannot be too emphatic in urging your appointees to take advantage of their predecessors' valuable experience in coping with their departments, their constituencies, and their particular Congressional committees. In the past, incoming officials have forfeited much of the advantage to be gained in tapping this source of information and advice. In 1952, for example, Charles Wilson neglected entirely to profit from the experience of Robert Lovett. Eight years later, the Kennedy Administration retained General Andrew Goodpaster through the transition period but made little effort to draw upon his experience. Those of your appointees who served in the Eisenhower Administration would do well to recall how little their own readiness to assist their successors was appreciated. If you can convince your appointees that the advice of former officeholders is a valuable resource not to be wasted, you will have taken a major step toward an effective and efficient transition.

III. Clearance of New Appointees

7. Arrangements must be made for investigating the personal background of your appointees for two reasons. First, some of your appointees will need the immediate security clearances necessary for direct access to classified information of the Johnson Administration. Nor will you yourself wish to entrust classified materials to your people, either before or after the inauguration, without the assurance of at least preliminary clearance. Second, you will probably want to continue the practice of investigating all potential Presidential appointees -- regardless of their need for classified data -- in order to assure yourself of their personal suitability for high government office.

8. The timing problem: Investigations not begun before the election require attention. Obviously, the process should be initiated as early as possible to avoid the delays incident to overloading the investigative agencies.

9. General procedure: (a) The reports on those needing pre-inaugural access to classified information must first be examined by the Administration -- perhaps the White House itself -- which can then relay both its decisions and the reports to you. Exposing such reports to the Administration may be politically undesirable but is probably unavoidable. It seems unlikely that the information thus revealed would be misused by the clearing officials. (b) Unless you receive * direct access to the investigative agencies, reports on persons not in the preceding category must also be channeled through the Administration. Here, however, the Administration is merely a conduit to you; it has no need to examine the content of the report. You should arrange for the Administration, therefore, to transmit to you the unopened reports on persons not requiring pre-inauguration security clearances.

10. In both the pre-election and post-inauguration periods, the problem can be mitigated through the use of temporary clearances. You will have to determine the availability, limits, and conditions for such clearances.

IV. Information for the President-Elect and his designees.

A. Current information.

11. You should request the kind of military, diplomatic, and foreign intelligence provided routinely for the President. Such information will give you background for decisions you will have to make after January 20th. Also it should help you to establish early guidelines for distinguishing presidential from departmental "business." And it may permit you to judge the form and adequacy of such information for your needs.

12. You will, of course, need a staff to sit astride this information flow, direct your attention to the matters most relevant for you, and otherwise absorb and use this flow. * Let us emphasize that your most useful and significant information may come not via formal transmissions from the old administration but via your own people working closely with incumbent counterparts -- as discussed later in this memorandum.

13. You should request a channel for obtaining appropriate briefings and memoranda on current problems for yourself and your people. The Administration would probably offer some on its own initiative but you should clear the way for making your own specific requests for information and analysis on both substantive matters and on transitional and organizational topics. **

* Your basic needs for a transition staff were noted in our August 15 memorandum; a later memorandum will address itself to White House organization.

** Whether you should seek authority to request data directly from the departments or from departmental staff is discussed in a later section.

Details are not crucial in your initial dealings with the Administration; they can be worked out later. What you must establish at the outset is the basic proposition that the President-Elect is entitled to full access and that government information should move freely to you and your designees. Whatever you can do to create an atmosphere of willing cooperation and respect for the President's own responsibilities will facilitate the flow of information.

14. One of your most difficult and critical problems during the transition will be the gaining of mastery (insofar as mastery is possible) over national security affairs. You may want to request President Johnson to assign you one or more career officials qualified to brief you during the transition period on military, intelligence, diplomatic and related matters. The person(s) selected would be appropriately cleared, sufficiently knowledgeable to interpret and amplify information received about substantive and agency problems, and sufficiently experienced and senior to be respected by both sides for intelligence and discretion. Such a person would know when it is appropriate to seek further information from the staffs with which he is familiar and when not to do so.

15. You might want to request access to some "cable traffic" into the White House as a preliminary exposure to later responsibilities. Your personal staff for national security matters, to take one example, could serve as an effective recipient of this information to promote their own education and as a conduit to you.

B. Other information, especially from the White House and Executive Office.

16. You should ask President Johnson to arrange some way of giving access (controlled by him) to national security materials that might be available, or readily available, only in White House files which leave with the retiring President.

a) One aspect of this request is easily presented and justified:

Eisenhower-Khrushchev conversations were covered completely only in the White House files which left with President Eisenhower. President Johnson would doubtless agree that a new President must know what the preceding President said to foreign officials.

b) Your request should, if possible, embrace a second and more elusive matter: There might be "limited distribution" or other closely held documents or memoranda that are conveniently assembled only in White House files.*

c) Perhaps you can do no more than to (1) raise the problem, (2) express confidence that President Johnson will do everything he properly can to make sure that his successor is fully informed on significant national security matters, and (3) leave the details to be worked out by your national security adviser(s) and their incumbent counterparts. This reinforces another point: Unlike President Kennedy's adviser, McGeorge Bundy, who did not begin work until January or assemble his staff until later, your national security staff should be appointed early and begin performance as soon as possible.

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* It is conceivable, for example, that complete details of various contacts with foreign officials on Vietnam matters may be so sensitive and restricted that full information vital to the new President might not be readily known to carry-over personnel or readily revealed by surviving files. In other cases, important material might be contained in permanent departmental files but yet not readily accessible because dispersed among voluminous other materials.

17. You should ask to see Task Force reports prepared for the President and not yet released to the public. You could point out that work by thoughtful people should not be wasted. You should, however, state your willingness to accept any limitations imposed by President Johnson as to acknowledgment, attribution, or quotation, and defer to his wishes regarding any reports which he might issue publicly himself or use in late messages and speeches.

18. You should ask for reorganization studies completed or underway in the Budget Bureau or in the Departments.

19. You will want to specify certain useful personnel information that could easily be assembled by the Bureau of the Budget: available Presidential and Departmental appointments (to the extent not published elsewhere), expiring term appointments, Presidential powers with respect to various classes of appointees, personnel policy decisions that need to be made within the first three months, etc.

20. You should request the preparation of a memorandum on technical operations of the White House, office and mansion -- budget, accounting, permanent personnel, customs, etc. This should be supplemented by personal consultation between incoming and outgoing officials. In addition, William Hopkins, the Executive Clerk, is a great storehouse of information on these matters.

21. The preceding enumeration of reports must not disguise the important truth that your best source of information lies not on paper but in people. Present (and former) members of the White House Staff are perhaps the most valuable resource of all for a new Administration. The unique experience and responsibility of Presidents seem to forge a common bond among them notwithstanding differences

of party or policy. Presidential staffs should find a similar bond arising from the special institution they serve. The insights, experience, and occasionally the negative example of incumbent and former staff members can be extremely illuminating for new people. And a common loyalty to the Presidency should be enough to encourage the future staff to seek and the present staff to offer candid discussion of the Office and its problems.

V. Orientation of New Appointees.

A. National Security and Budget observers.

22. Since you will need to master, at the earliest possible moment, the massive flow of communications and advice relating to national security policy, you should give high priority to obtaining from the outgoing administration permission for your prospective Special Assistant(s) for national security affairs to work with their incumbent counterpart(s), and, if possible, immediately nearby, hopefully in adjoining offices. If such an arrangement is not offered by President Johnson, you should request it. The terms of your understanding with the outgoing President should not preclude your designating more than one person for this function. Even if you choose to centralize responsibility on your own staff, your designee will want assistance to help in learning procedures, in mastering substantive issues, and perhaps in examining files soon to be removed.

23. In addition, your Administration must become familiar -- promptly and in depth -- with the Budget Bureau and its current work on the 1970 budget. Apart from intimate intra-Administration considerations of peculiarly partisan matters,

It would be helpful for your Director (or other designee) and a few key staff to observe as much of the budget preparation process as they can absorb. In this way, your appointees can understand the nature of current issues, can help you make preliminary judgments about the issues you want to re-examine after Inauguration, and can better handle the new or repeated departmental requests confronting them in early 1969. Close cooperation during the transition period has become traditional in Budget, and it is a salutary tradition. In the unlikely event that the Administration fails to offer cooperation in this area, you should request it.

B. General orientation of appointees.

24. To reiterate a key point, you will find no greater resource in the outgoing Administration than the expertise and experience of its staff and appointees. In the past, incoming officials have generally suffered to learn the same lessons time and again because they have not profited from their predecessors' experience. On the whole, this seems attributable more to mistrust of the predecessors rather than to any unwillingness of the latter to be helpful. Of course, not everyone can be equally helpful. Of course, much that is said will have to be discounted by different interests and circumstances. But the fact is: outgoing officials are a valuable resource that should be utilized by the incoming officials during the transition period.

25. You should press the old Administration to encourage Secretaries, Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, Administrators, and other Presidential appointees to receive their counterparts and to acquaint them with the administrative practices and substantive issues of their agencies.

a) You can expect the office of each Presidential appointee to have prepared an appropriate 'briefing book' on administrative and substantive matters. Even excessively voluminous and routinely bureaucratic products can be useful to the appointee (or his special assistant). Even the routine product can identify such basic information (often unknown to new appointees) as both the 'hot' and recurring issues facing the agency, the identity and arguments of important interest groups concerned with each issue, and the relevant Congressional considerations.

b) On such topics, you should advise your appointees to seek the views of the incumbents. The direct exchange can be more sharply focused and more candid.

c) Furthermore, you should recommend that your appointees ask outgoing officials (on a discreet and informal basis) for their views on the agencies' career people. (We would hope that some information of this type would have been gathered in the pre-election period.) The new official with a different policy outlook may react differently, but incoming and outgoing officials will often have a common reaction -- independent of policy -- to a subordinate's qualities. In time, the new people may learn, as did their predecessors, that a subordinate is analytical, concerned, diligent, articulate, concise, skeptical, discreet, or the opposites. While the new official will not want to be bound by the predecessor's opinions, the latter's views can accelerate the process of testing and appraising. And, of course, subordinates are most useful to one who knows what discounts and premiums to apply to their work.

26. Some incumbent officials may value their successors or their agencies sufficiently to open their offices to their successors, letting them read much of the paper traffic and to observe conferences and meetings with subordinates and

outsiders. Whether any particular official makes such an offer will depend upon his work and working habits and the mesh of personalities. This assumes that the "open office" approach occurs to him both as a possibility and as one to which the President would not object. It follows, therefore, that if the President makes no mention of the subject to you, you should diplomatically suggest its usefulness. You should urge him, if agreeable, to authorize such cooperation perhaps by mentioning it in a Cabinet discussion of transitional arrangements. Some such approach as this is almost imperative in the State and Defense and perhaps elsewhere, depending on your plans.

27. These approaches are not without this danger: such one to one interaction between incumbents and new appointees may unconsciously and uncritically tend to freeze existing patterns of organization, allocations of responsibility, or ways of seeing problems. We see two possible countermeasures: First, you can make your appointees conscious of the issue, demand critical thinking about it, and warn that organizational arrangements are subject to review and revision. Second, it may be possible to postpone the appointment of some Assistant Secretaries in those departments which can be efficiently managed at the outset without the full complement of Assistant Secretaries. If so, your primary appointees would have more time for a thorough personnel search and for a careful review of effective organizational possibilities within the department.

28. Pre-inauguration access of appointees to the departmental staffs will probably be opposed by the old Administration which might fear a premature transfer of staff loyalty. Because no categorical rule can cope entirely with

individual and departmental variations, such contacts are best left to be worked out agency by agency. At the Presidential level, you should limit yourself to two requests:

a) Your study groups and task forces may feel particular need for access to relevant departmental files and experts. Fully knowledgeable outside experts are, to be sure, often available. But where this is not the case, the government experts may be essential for thorough appreciation of the data and correct analysis. You should specify these situations as clearly as you can and request access relevant to them. (They will be relatively few in number.)

b) You should seek agreement in principle that agencies lend a suitable "expert or two" to the new officials or task forces when they request them and when such aid can be provided without disrupting the current work of the agency.

29. General pre-inauguration access to files (as distinct from staff) might be rejected altogether if sought at the Presidential level. Since permanent departmental files will be available later, the Administration may hesitate to grant early access. You should ask no more than authority to make arrangements on a case-by-case basis with each department. In light of your hopes to include younger men in the intimate workings of Government, you might seek permission to designate relatively junior persons -- prospective special assistants to high officials -- to study relevant files and other background information which they can later bring to bear in giving post-inauguration assistance to their chiefs. In other situations, such work might make it possible to delay the appointment of some Assistant Secretaries, as discussed earlier. This technique could prove extremely valuable

in selected offices where orientation of new appointees is difficult. Possible examples are the Secretariat and a few other offices in the State Department as well as I. S. A. and Systems Analysis in Defense.

30. You should arrange quite early to have at least one incumbent official remain as Acting Secretary in each Department. He will exercise formal statutory power until the new Secretary and his team are confirmed (which might not occur on Inauguration day or the next).

31. There are certain technical areas where you may expect a briefing from the Administration. If one is not offered, you should request the following information:

a) To what extent will departmental office space be available? In 1960-61, ten new officials were housed in State and two in each of the other Departments. To accommodate any larger number might well prove disruptive but if an "open office" policy is in effect, new officials would have to be housed nearby. In other situations location may not be crucial if adequate information is available.

b) What funds are available to the President-Elect under the Transition Act for personnel, supplies, consultants, travel, and office space?

c) To what extent can the various departments help to absorb the expenses of transition by lending office space and clerical and professional assistance?

VI. The Handling of Crises

32. If a crisis arises during the transition and the response of the President will have major continuing consequences (e. g., American response to a Chinese invasion of Vietnam), the President will doubtless want to consult you since yours will be the longer burden.

You probably have little choice but to assume that the President acts in good faith when he calls upon you. The public would expect you to consult with the President in a time of national emergency. You will have been receiving and digesting information before and after the election; your confidence in the data will be proportional to the variety of your sources. Nevertheless, you may hesitate to share the responsibility, even symbolically, without clearly adequate information or time for deliberation, without decision-making authority, and without the inescapable mandate of office.

No one can tell either principal his duty. This much is clear: the President can see that you are kept fully informed and invite you to express your views. You may wish to decline and in most cases this is a real option. However, there may be a crisis of such proportions that silence or the standard formulations of concern are inadequate responses. Then if you have a clear policy view, there is every reason to state it. Beyond this we do not venture.