

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
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41	7	11/13/1968	Memo	To: RN (via Haldeman) From: Buchanan Re: Views on White House Staff. 4 Pages.
41	7	11/18/1968	Letter	To: H. R. Haldeman From: S. B. Bull Re: "Former Presidents, Allowances and Special Provisions for." 1 Page.
41	7	11/19/1968	Letter	To: H. S.[sic] Haldeman From: S. B. Bull Re: "Former Presidents, Allowances and Special Provisions for." 1 Page.
41	7	11/20/n.d.	Letter	To: H. R. Haldeman From: Herbert W. Kalmbach Re: Crispus A. Wright. 1 Page.
41	7	11/21/1968	Letter	To: Larry Higby From: Dave Derge Re: NBC Nationnationwide Key Precinct Analysis for Jewish Vote. 1 Page.
41	7	11/22/1968	Memo	To: RN From: Sears Re: "Reorganization of the National Committee and the Relationship Between the White House and National Committee." 22 Pages.

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41	7	11/25/1968	Letter	To: RN and Bob Haldeman From: P. M. Flanigan Re: John Loeb. 1 Page.
41	7	11/28/1968	Memo	To: Bob Haldeman From: Bryce Harlow Re: Conversation with General Goodpaster in Saigon. 1 Page. Attached to memo from Harlow to RN dated 11/27/1968.
41	7	11/27/1968	Memo	To: RN From: Harlow Re: Conversation with Andy Goodpaster. 1 Page.
41	7	n.d.	Memo	To: HRH From: RZ Re: Analysis of the national press corps, reporters attitudes, and reporters votes. 8 Pages.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12356, Section 1.1
By RTP NARS, Date 4/8/87

file

MEMORANDUM

TO: RN (via Haldeman)
FROM: Buchanan

DATE: Nov. 13, 1968

Some of these thoughts I have already relayed to Bryce, but I wanted to get them directly to RN before getting out of town. These reflect some of my views on the White House staff; and RN can discount them given Buchanan's prejudices and predispositions.

1) If RN is going to build a New Majority, we have to get cracking on building and expanding the party in the border states and the South, as well as the Midwest and West. The party has to be united and working together in all these states for us to win -- 1968 demonstrated the tremendous resiliency and strength of the Democrats. My own suggestion would be to put Sears in as a White House Assistant with responsibility to the President for reporting on the condition of the party in every state; he should, as well have some measure of authority for settling disputes and scrounging for new Congressional candidates and for liaison with the Hill and the RNC. Sears is loyal to RN, enormously competent, well liked by press and politicians and without peer in terms of knowledge of the various States situations.

*I agree -
under
Ehrlich
H*

2) Press Secretary. Directly and indirectly, several members of the press corps friendly to RN have indicated that it would be a grave error for Ziegler to be named press spokesman.

He won't be.

First, he is an "advertising man" which turns them off at once; secondly, he is without knowledge on issues and politics and third, he has no seasoning.

3) RN needs close by him some advisor with "soul" for lack of a better term. By that I mean someone who understands and will counsel RN to utilize the vast powers inherent in the majesty of the office and the respect in which it is held. FDR and the Kennedys recognized that you do not speak to the poor in statements and speeches alone, that you speak in symbols and gestures as well. A dramatic and gracious RN visit to a Negro community, done with dignity and decorum can help more to win the blacks back to the national fold than any of Humphrey's "programs." The same is true of the young. RN, I believe, should have close to him someone who recognizes and knows how RN can use the tremendous powers, the third and fourth dimensions of communication offered to him by the office he now holds. I don't know who is the man, but RN needs some people of both passion and compassion close by. *Moore + Finch + Garment*

4) RN needs to widen his circle of advisors, in my view. The point is not that any particular individual should be there, but that ^{more} points of view should be represented. The Congressional Establishment, the Liberal Establishment nationally, the Jewish intellectuals, the conservatives; labor, the Wall Street Crowd, and the business community, the stock market: RN should know how all of these various elements are going to react to various

moves. And to do that RN has got to have a base of advisors who know something about each of these, who march to the different drums of differing groups of Americans.

There were in my own view, a few mistakes made in the general election that might have been avoided if the ideas had been run by a few more people.

Nowhere is this need for reliable backboards more urgent than in the final selection of Cabinet members. I know the requirements of secrecy and time, but I think that these selections should be checked out as exhaustively as possible for both competence and political impact of their appointment. We are going to have to live with these people; they can make or break us, and if we err on any side, for God's sake, let it be on the side of too much checking and too many opinions sought.

5) In selecting the new men around him in the White House, RN must concentrate not only on people who know how to administer things, but on some men who have a clear idea of what they want the Nixon Administration to accomplish. We need some men near RN with fire in their bellies who want to change things, to accomplish set goals, not just to hold power.

6) RN in moving as President should not be a "conservative" in his actions; he should not be induced into any sense of caution or hesitence by the fact of our tiny plurality. That is a

myth we can disregard, if we will fill the Cabinet with Big Men. If RN will act with decisiveness and daring, then we will build the majority as President that we did not win as candidate.

7) The greatest asset we have as President is that trust, that bond between President and people which LBJ squandered away by lack of candor and lack of openness. This bond of trust can survive and even prosper in failure, if we maintain it. Remember JFK was never held higher in public esteem than when he took public responsibility for the disaster at the Bay of Pigs.

8) In setting up his White House staff RN ought not let himself be straight-jacketed by any past model; and I for one would like to see on the staff there perhaps some maverick intellectual like a Milton Friedman responsible for spinning off ideas about how RN is going to accomplish this goal of decentralization.

file

RECEIVED COMM GEN
KEY BISCAYNE:
18 NOV 68 6:3 P.M. Local

RR WTE17
DE WTE16 003

FROM S. B. BULL
TO H. R. HALDEMAN
CITE NY0003

SUBJECT: FORMER PRESIDENTS, ALLOWANCES AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR.

1. U.S. CODE ANNOTATED - 1967 ("FOR USE IN 1968") PROVIDES AS FOLLOWS:

TITLE 3, PARAGRAPH 102, SECTION 5,
SUB PARAGRAPH:

A. MONETARY ALLOWANCE OF \$25,000 PER ANNUM, FOR LIFE

B. AN OFFICE STAFF, THE TOTAL COST OF WHICH WILL NOT EXCEED
\$65,000 PER ANNUM

C. OFFICE SPACE, "APPROPRIATELY FURNISHED AND EQUIPPED, AS
DETERMINED BY THE ADMINISTRATOR (OF GENERAL SERVICES).

E. WIDOW OF A FORMER PRESIDENT TO RECEIVE A PENSION OF \$10,000
PER ANNUM.

2. OTHER PRIVILEGES NOT SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY THIS ACT BUT
PROVIDED BY CUSTOM AND SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE ACT, IS BEING
INVESTIGATED. INFORMATION TO FOLLOW.

S. B. BULL

DTG 182315Z NOV 1968

RECEIVED KEY BISCAYNE
Comm CEN:

19 Nov 68 2:10 P.M. Local

00 WTE17
DE WTE16 005

FROM S.B. BULL
TO H.S. HALDEMAN
CITE NY0005

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: FORMER PRESIDENTS, ALLOWANCES AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR

FURTHER TO COMMUNICATION OF 18 NOV 1968, THIS SUBJECT.

1. TITLE 39, SECTION 4165 (POSTAL SECTION) PROVIDES FOR ALL MAIL OF A FORMER PRESIDENT TO BE CONVEYED ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE INDIVIDUAL'S FRANK.
2. PRESIDENTS' KENNEDY AND JOHNSON HAVE MADE AVAILABLE AIRCRAFT TO CONVEY A FORMER PRESIDENT TO CONDUCT BUSINESS IN THE "PUBLIC SERVICE". IN ADDITION, WHEN IN WASHINGTON, D.C. ON THIS TYPE OF BUSINESS, A VEHICLE IS AVAILABLE. THESE PROVISIONS HAVE BEEN USED VERY SPARINGLY BY GEN. EISENHOWER. HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT AS A RETIRED 5-STAR GENERAL HE IS ENTITLED TO MANY COURTESIES AND BENEFITS OF THIS NATURE.
3. CERTAIN BENEFITS SUCH AS SECRET SERVICE PROTECTION, FRANKING, AND REIMBURSEMENT FOR AN OFFICE STAFF WERE ACCORDED MRS. KENNEDY BY SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE ACT.
4. ACCORDING TO GENERAL SCHULTZ, AIDE TO GENERAL EISENHOWER, NO OTHER COURTESIES OR BENEFITS ARE ACCORDED FORMER PRESIDENTS.

DTG: 191830Z NOV 1968

file

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L

November 21, 1968


TO: LARRY HIGBY
FROM: DAVE DERGE
SOURCE: NBC Key Precinct Analysis--Nationwide

HHH 81%
RMN 17%
Wallace 2%

} Jewish vote

Gallup's June findings showed 7% of Jews to be
Republicans.

This is "confidential."



PMF
what did Goldwater get in 64?
what did KN get in 60?

file
November 22, 1968

MEMO TO: RN
FROM: Sears
RE: Reorganization of the National Committee
and the Relationship Between The White
House and National Committee

I. General Discussion: As a result of the November 5th election, it is obvious that the future of the Republican Party, together with its political base, lies in an area stretching from Florida to the State of Washington. This area includes all of the Old South, the Middle West, with the exception of Michigan and Minnesota, and all of the Far West. In the Northeast, Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey and Pennsylvania should be considered border states under the new configuration and over the next few years. The election results in these states, as well as Michigan and Minnesota, will vary from year to year depending on issues, events and candidates. New York, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut and, for a while, West Virginia must be considered Democratic strongholds. Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont will remain Republican.

The political job over the next two years is to build and establish the Party within the confines of its Florida-Washington base, making it so strong in these areas that it can be counted upon to deliver a Republican majority in statewide elections. Once this is done, and we are sure of our base, we can tackle the larger problem of making Pennsylvania, Maryland and New Jersey more predictably Republican and establishing stronger organization in Michigan, New York and Connecticut. If we do our job in the Florida-Washington areas well enough over the next two years, this second phase (the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, New York, Michigan, Connecticut push) could be commenced after the 1970 elections. The objective of both Phase I, aimed at establishing a sure base of Republican electoral votes in any national election and gaining control of the House and Senate in 1970, and Phase II, the push in the Northern states mentioned above, will result in making the Republican Party the majority party in this country four years hence.

II. General Problems: If the above two-phase plan is to be accomplished in four years, a number of things must be set in motion immediately: (1) the power and authority of the Presidency must be brought to bear on the National Committee to completely remodel it, both in terms of personnel and function; (2) the Congressional Campaign Committee, the Senatorial Campaign Committee and the Republican Governors Association must be abolished, at least insofar as they now attempt to perform some campaign function, and their political functions transferred to a strengthened National Committee; (3) federal patronage, both in terms of jobs and projects, must be funnelled through a central source in the White House to be sure that its distribution is serving the best political purpose possible. For the next two years, patronage must be used almost exclusively to build the party in the Florida-Washington base and not to reward incumbent Republicans. After we have won control of the Congress, we can use an appropriate amount of it to keep our incumbents popular; (4) the patronage which flows from the many governmental agencies must be funnelled through the same central source, and this must all be coordinated with the patronage which our many Republican governors are distributing; (5) the selection of candidates for

the 1970 elections in Virginia and New Jersey must commence immediately, and the White House, while not dabbling in this matter publicly, should use its power and authority to be sure that the best candidates run and without going through damaging primaries.

All of this, as well as many other more particular functions, will have to be undertaken while RN is trying to deal with a Democratic Congress, confronting the grave national problems that face us and beating down the normal amount of sharply aimed criticism from the Democrats. It is not too unlikely that Teddy Kennedy, who already has begun rustling around to gain control of his party, will start running against us next year, and this will be a separate problem to deal with.

III. The Proposed Function of the Remodeled National Committee:

If we are to change the leadership of the National Committee, as well as its personnel, and abolish the Congressional Campaign Committee and the Senatorial Campaign Committee, it must be expected that this will generate a certain amount of internal dissension in the party itself. Ray Bliss, while he certainly can't win any confrontations with RN, has a few cards to play. Quite wrongly, most of the state

chairmen believe that he has done a good job and see no reason to replace him. He has cultivated their loyalty assiduously against the time when someone might try to replace him. Were he a different kind of fellow, we could kick him upstairs somewhere, but I can't think of any place where he could do a decent job.

Therefore, if we are to replace him we must be sure that the person or persons who take over his obligations are acceptable to the National Committee members and such good appointments that we can keep the bitching to a minimum. I am in agreement with the concept of having a two-man Chairmanship, a name Chairman who is a spokesman for the party and the Administration, and a second man with a lesser title who is a purely political mechanic. While RN will have to decide on the top spot himself since this man will have to speak for him, I think that Keith Bulen would be an ideal selection for the second position. Bulen is highly regarded in the National Committee, a strong and thorough organizer; he has proven himself tough enough to move a lot of people around and break some china, yet maintains a strong respect, even among those whom he has offended. He has been through a similar exercise to that we are facing in his own state

of Indiana, and is therefore aware of some of the problems that might not be apparent to others. Most important, he could be counted upon to be totally loyal.

In order to hold down the public clamor in this regard to abolishing the two Campaign Committees, I think that it is necessary to proceed by first abolishing their fund-raising capabilities and lodging those with the National Committee; and then we can proceed to take over their other functions in regard to candidate selection and campaign services. Once they no longer have any fund-raising capability, you will have them on a pretty short string anyway.

As a temporary mechanism to make it easy on everybody, I think that a general campaign committee should be formed at the National Committee comprised of the National Chairman, his political second, a member of the House, a Senator, and a Governor. This committee would in actuality have no campaign function but would serve as a substitute for the present arrangement. Also, the Governor, the Senator, and the Congressman could help the National Chairman in his spokesman duties.

As to the functions which a revamped National Committee should perform, they should be the following:

A. State Organization -- Political organizations are built at the state level by a combination of patronage, discipline and co-ordination with the White House. The National Committee should have responsibility for riding herd on the state chairmen to be sure that state patronage is being distributed as best suits the organizational growth, that registration programs are properly carried out, that special interest is maintained in particular voting groups which are either fundamental to that particular state or with which we are weak and, on the whole, insure that the state organizations are run efficiently and with the required discipline.

B. Campaign Managers -- While the National Committee in the past has made some ineffective stabs at improving the work of our state chairmen, no one has ever made any effort to train any campaign managers. My feeling about the state chairman situation is that if we find that a particular state chairman does not know how to carry out his office, we should replace him with one who does, instead of trying to train him. In the last election, at least four Senate seats were lost because of bad campaign managers,

and even in areas where we won, I would be hard-pressed to point to any good campaign managers. As will be stated in detail later in this memorandum, we have an excellent chance in the off-year elections of 1970, especially in the Senate, but we are likely to fritter away this opportunity unless we can train some campaign managers in the meantime. I would charge the National Committee with this responsibility.

C. Money Raising -- The National Committee should have full responsibility for raising all money necessary for the upcoming off-year elections. This should be commenced immediately, and should occupy a majority of the Committee's time over the next year. Two years from now the Committee will be asked to finance 14 target Senate races and about 45 target Congressional races. This, in addition to the ordinary financing that has been required in the past.

D. Suburban Program -- The opportunity for growth in the party over the next ten years does not lie in the cities. We are woefully out-organized there; most voters have a bad impression of the Republican party and probably won't change until conditions change demonstrably for the better under a Republican Administration, and the historic ties to the Democratic party, especially among

blacks and other non-white racial groups are so strong that they can only be broken over a long period of time.

In point of actual fact, even now the largest single block of voters in each of the fifteen largest states in this country reside in the suburbs, with the exception of New York and Texas. Even in New York and Texas, a combination of the suburban vote and the rural vote far outweighs that in the cities. The complex of the suburbs is in a drastic state of change with considerable numbers of former city dwellers in the process of moving to the suburbs. Once there and owning property, they have a tendency to become more Republican in their thought than they were in the cities as matters of taxes and local government come more forcefully home to them. The real challenge for us then is to improve our organization in these areas.

At present, both parties are very poorly organized, and due to the great change in the population of these areas, a large share of the voters are not even identified as to party affiliation or leaning. In the main the Democrats have tried to perpetuate the "clubhouse" method of organization, but this does not work at all in areas that are spread out geographically and have no central characteristics of race or economic level. Our party which in most cases was their first, operates as though

it were a small town concern rather than suburban. We still elect the town clerks in most of the non-Southern areas but are out of touch with the new voters who moved over the last eight or nine years. I think the National Committee should be responsible for developing and implementing a program specifically aimed at the suburbs. This should be done immediately and should occupy a large share of the Committee's time when it is not raising money during the next year.

E. Young Voters Program -- In combination with the efforts of the Administration in this area, the National Committee should institute a new program aimed to attract to the party as workers and voters those between the ages of 18 and 30. The Young Republicans, while they make a great deal of noise, have been an ineffective vehicle for attracting youth to the party. The Young Republicans are too restrictive philosophically and are mainly concerned with power struggles within their own body instead of making any attempt to generate a broad appeal to youth. They are also too old, the age limit being technically thirty-five, but many members staying on till well past forty. Instead of encouraging membership, the present leadership group often discourages it since they are fearful that if a lot of new members join the organization the so-called "syndicate" will be voted out of power.

Beyond the Young Republicans, there are a number of other conservative youth groups which should be dried up. If this is to be done, a strong hand will have to be exercised from the National Committee. While this does not sound like a high-priority responsibility, it would help to develop our organization fantastically if we could develop a better program for young voters so that we don't wind up trying to convert them from being Democrats when they are 35, as is presently the case.

F. Early Warning System -- One material way that the Democrats have always been much better than we are has been that up and down the ranks of their organization they have usually been better prepared to defend the actions of the Democratic Administrations to the voting public. In the Democratic party, precinct chairmen are usually well enough aware of the "party-line" that they can answer the routine questions of voters within their block about most actions that are taken by the President or the party. We have never had this kind of discipline in our party, and, therefore, when a concerned voter asks his precinct chairman why we did "X" he usually stands and looks at the sky and shakes his head. I think it would be extremely helpful for the National Committee in co-ordination with:

the White House and Congress to be charged with the responsibility of mailing to a large mailing list of party workers a "party-line" on any significant development. A very wise politician once told me that "the most effective way to influence the voters is to have your own clowns charged up and able to give the impression they are on the inside." This is absolutely true, and this program would be aimed at keeping the "clowns" charged up.

G. Direct Mail -- In place of the extraordinary amounts of trash that the National Committee now circulates to a vast mailing list, the National Committee should make available to the state committees specified mailings aimed at selling the party and the Administration. The cost factor on this could be worked out jointly by the National Committee and state committees, and the state committees could do the actual mailings. This would help and encourage the state committees to develop their own mailing lists as well. Even in the days of television, no one has ever found a substitute for direct mail in politics.

H. Liaison with the White House -- The political mechanic at the National Committee should be in close contact with the political man at the White House on matters of patronage, party re-organization, and general strategy.

As stated above, the National Committee will be raising the money, training campaign managers and implementing specific programs in the suburbs and among youth, but since all of the re-organization described above will take time, much of the burden of distributing patronage, working out the knotty problems of candidate selection and choosing the target races for 1970 will have to come from the White House. The mechanic at the National Committee should be made fully aware of these White House functions, and they should be co-ordinated with the activities of the National Committee through his person.

IV. The White House Role: As stated in I, we are examining a two-phase program: (1) establishing and building a base for the party that stretches from Florida to the state of Washington with the goal of carrying the Senate and House in 1970, and (2) thereafter concentrating on specific states outside that base to build the party into a majority party by 1972. Since a great deal of time will be taken up at the National Committee in accomplishing the re-organization set forth in III, and pressing the programs suggested there, it will be necessary, as well as advisable, for the White House to carry out the following political functions:

A. The Co-ordination and Distribution of Patronage -- There should be one man at the White House through whom all patronage is funnelled. He would work in conjunction with the political man at the National Committee and to some extent with our Congressional liaison. He should have flowing through him all direct federal patronage, all patronage of the agencies of the federal government and a knowledge of what patronage the Republican governors have and how they are using it. The above should be true for both job appointments and work projects. For the next two years, the vast majority of patronage should be used to build the party within the Florida-Washington base with the added hope that certain individuals whom we are trying to build up to run for office in 1970 can be benefitted by the use of patronage also. Very little patronage should be used during this period to reward incumbent officeholders. Once we gain a majority in the House and Senate, we can use our patronage to insure the incumbents' popularity, but using it for that purpose now would defeat our goal of carrying Congress. There will be some bitching about this, but that's the way it will have to be for the next couple of years. The person handling the patronage must be very aware politically, so that when we decide to build a dam in Arkansas he can call up the local county chairman and alert him. The local county

chairman in turn should then be able to call up his old buddy, "Joe" and tell him he has got a job, thus obligating "Joe," his family, and friends. This over-simplification is basically how it should work. I might add that under this scheme, the National Committee would be responsible for riding on the local county chairman to be sure that he knows some "Joe's" to call.

B. Candidate Selection -- There are some 32 Senate seats up for election in 1970, only seven of which are Republican (Fannin, Murphy, Scott, Williams, Hruska, Fong, and Goodell). The seven Republican seats look to be quite safe. The 25 Democrats make up the class of '58, which was swept into office in a year when we lost heavily and re-elected in 1964 when it was almost impossible to lose if you were a Democrat. Outside of a few safe Senate seats in the South, a large number of these 25 seats can be won if we start early enough and put up decent candidates.

Many of these target Senate seats are in the Florida-Washington area that we will be concentrating on in the next two years (MaGee, Burdick, Cannon, Hartke, Gore, Moss, Holland, Montoya, Proxmire, Young and Yaroborough). In Michigan, New Jersey and possibly Connecticut (Hart, Williams, and Dodd, respectively), seats are also up for election which we could win with the right candidates.

Far too often in the past we have lost for one of two reasons: bad candidates or bad campaign management. The White House power and authority should be brought to bear on the first of these problems and the National Committee should try to solve the second as indicated above. While the President cannot get directly involved in selecting Senatorial candidates, it is a fairly easy matter to freeze out individuals who should not be running by letting the word get around in party circles that the White House thinks "X" should make the race. Some of our Governors should be encouraged immediately to seek Senatorial nominations and if they work early and swiftly, they can avoid going through any harmful primaries. This does not mean they need to publicly announce their candidacies; just that we privately understand that they will be willing to make the race and can count on that fact. In some areas (North Dakota, for example) a Congressman (Mark Andrews perhaps, or if not, Tom Kleppe) should be tested out early as to whether it is possible for them to run for the Senate. The tender problem of maneuvering the right man into running for the Senate in these particular states without offending the local party should be the responsibility of the White House man since he can speak with the authority of the President and will be able to devote more of his time to working out any problems with getting the right candidate

to run through the use of patronage. He should, of course, consult various sources before deciding on any particular candidate in any particular state.

In the House we have suffered from the same problem of poor candidates and poor campaign managers. Even though we've had a Congressional Campaign Committee which has spent an inordinate amount of time and money trying to select candidates, we still run into the problem of men running for the House from particular areas in which they just cannot appeal to the voters. As an example, in this past election, our candidate in the 24th District of Pennsylvania (Erie) was a Protestant Minister, this in a district which is heavily Catholic and heavily ethnic. Add this to the fact that his Democratic opponent was an Italian, and it is not hard to see why we lost this district which had been Republican for a substantial period of time up until 1964. In the 2nd District of Iowa (Cedar Rapids) we ran a lawyer who had never been out on a farm and should any manure have attached to his shoe, he probably would have thrown his shoes away. This in a district which can be carried for the Republicans if we can get a strong farm vote in the counties outside of Cedar Rapids. It is presently held by a Congressman who no more fits the District than Adolph Hitler could

represent the Lower East Side. Yet we lost it for the third straight time.

It is suggested that in approximately 45 target Congressional districts that the White House take a very active interest in the candidates selected to run and that the National Committee see to it that they are well-financed and well-managed. Advice as to these candidates can be obtained from reliable sources in the states, and the candidates can be screened by the political man at the National Committee, as well as by the man at the White House.

C. Political Advice to the President, Vice President, and Cabinet -- In making various decision the President may need the benefit of political advice from someone in the White House who is aware enough of what is going on in the country to be able to form judgment as to how various Presidential decisions will be received. In regard to the Vice President, since much of what he does will involve dealing with the Governors, it might be helpful to him to have the advice of a politician so that programs such as block-grants to the states can be implemented in areas where they will both serve the public good and the good of the Republican party. The same is true for the members of the Cabinet dealing with domestic policy.

In addition, at least some of the time of the Vice President and the Cabinet members should be spent in helping to build the party through well-placed speaking engagements and, in regard to the Vice President, a fairly strenuous program of fund raising speeches. These should be coordinated through the White House man.

D. Congressional Operations -- From time to time, while trying to get legislation through a Democratic Congress, it may be necessary to put some extra pressure on some of the Democratic members in order to obtain their votes (for example, generating a lot of mail from their district encouraging them to vote for the bill or being in close enough contact with some of their contributors to generate a few telephone calls to them). This is not a function that the Congressional liaison can adequately take care of, nor is it one that the National Committee should involve itself in. Again, it is a matter of delicacy which must be handled apart from any involvement of the President, but the White House, the only institution with the power and authority to generate such pressures. I think it should, therefore, be the responsibility of the political man in the White House to see that this is done if necessary.

E. Candidate Building -- Sometimes we have been in the situation where we have had good candidates but they were totally unknown to the populace of the area where they were running. The White House should co-operate with the National Committee in seeing to it that we don't run any races in 1970 in the target areas at least where the candidate is not "known" to the voting public. This involves working the prospective candidates into various short-term governmental committees and operations, so that they can obtain a little publicity back home. Basically it should be handled by the White House political man, but there will be areas where co-ordination with the National Committee man will be helpful.

F. Liaison with the National Committee -- Certainly the White House man should keep in close contact with the man at the National Committee and work with him to accomplish the programs described in III. A close working arrangement between these two individuals is imperative if the plan is to work. The two should work well enough together that they can freely exchange thoughts about both their responsibilities.

G. Defining the White House Function -- Since it would be costly for the world at large to know that the White House was going to take such an active interest in the building of the party and selecting candidates, and the political use of patronage, it would be best to describe the political operative at the White House merely as the President's chief political advisor and combine his above-stated duties with a few others which won't take up much of his time, but will give the impression that he is not spending a majority of his time on politics. In line with this it would be appropriate for him to take over the duties of the Cabinet Secretary and also some responsibilities for working with Vice President Agnew. Both of these functions can be helpful in the political vein, since I would hope that the Cabinet could be used for political purpose and certainly Vice President Agnew should devote a healthy portion of his time to the political effort. The Cabinet Secretary function would be helpful to the political man in that he would have some way to keep apprised of what substantive matters were being decided in the Departments which might be of

political benefit, and it would allow him to keep a better rein on the patronage flowing from the Cabinet positions. The political man should not be given the title of Cabinet Secretary; however, he should assume the function. To carry out his job he'll need a title of appropriate weight in the White House staff.

file

November 25, 1968

TO: RN ✓
Bob Haldeman

RE: John Loeb

I met with Loeb for the suggested discussion. Loeb told me that it is true that in one week he and Wayne Andreas, with minor help from George Ball, raised \$5,000,000 in the form of loans (Sidney Weinberg was not involved in this activity). The candidate met with the loan endorsers and gave them a strong personal commitment to work to pay off these loans.

Loeb says that he himself is not particularly interested in whether or not his loan is paid off. However he does have some responsibility to the other members of the group. He is lunching today with the candidate and Andreas and will discuss the matter then.

Loeb wonders if the proposed position would be helpful assuming the candidate wants to continue active in politics. I tried to sell the benefits of him taking this job. I also pointed out that in small private dinners he could be active in redeeming his pledge.

We agreed that the key was whether or not the candidate wanted to take the offered position. If he does, it would seem that arrangements could be made so that the loans need not stand in the way. Loeb said he would be in touch with me after the meeting.

P.M.Flanigan

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12356, Section 1.1
By RJP NARS, Date 4/8/87

~~Confidential~~
MEMORANDUM

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November 28, 1968

TO: BOB HALDEMAN

FROM: BRYCE HARLOW *BH*

On November 27 I talked with General Goodpaster in Saigon.

He was responding to my request for a recommendation of a high-quality officer competent to do for RN what Goodpaster did for President Eisenhower on the White House staff.

Goodpaster recommends Col. Robert G. Gard (0-62355). Gard is now in Vietnam and has been there six or seven months. He is Commander of Division Artillery of one of the American divisions in Vietnam.

Goodpaster says he is "absolutely first-rate and top-flight." He taught at West Point. He has had excellent advance schooling including the War College. He was the top man in his class at the War College.

One wonderment about Gard: after the War College, he was assigned to the Pentagon in an executive capacity with Secretary McNamara and stayed on for a time with Secretary Clifford. But, Goodpaster says, Gard is "straight professionally" and would be totally loyal to President Nixon.

Of great importance: note attached copy of my memorandum about General Goodpaster himself. Could be that we will want to use Goodpaster and forget Gard!

MEMORANDUM

November 27, 1968

TO: RN
FROM: HARLOW

Late this evening I had a discussion with Andy Goodpaster, exploring frankly whether or not his involvement in the White House would help or injure his career. I assured him of your high personal esteem and of your strong feeling that you would not wish to take any action which could be injurious to him in any way.

I am to call him back on Friday, November 29.

His reaction was, predictably, "honor, duty, country." I gather he is totally prepared as a career soldier to do without regret whatever the Commander-In-Chief might suggest or request. I am sure he both means and feels that.

Perhaps you would wish to give me guidelines on my follow-up conversation with him Friday, to make certain that I do not misrepresent your feelings about this and to insure that I do not carry this beyond your personal desire.

cc: Robert Haldeman

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E.O. 12356, Section 1.1
By RJD NARS, Date 4/8/87

file

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

TO: HRH

FROM: RZ

The following is an analysis of the national press corps that covered RN on a regular basis during the campaign. The judgment of each individual is based upon conversation, attitudes and copy filed. An attempt at accuracy has, of course, been made. However, in an analysis such as this it is difficult to be absolutely accurate.

As you read through the analysis, it will be noted that there are many "undetermined" votes. This is due to the fact that, even though the press corps is of course generally liberal, during the 1968 campaign they were not emotionally committed to Humphrey. Therefore, some of the undetermined may have been swayed to vote for RN -- some who may not have been expected to. However, I would weight the undetermined category to Humphrey.

I think the important thing is -- and I have mentioned this on a number of occasions -- that a concensus did not develop in the press corps during the 1968 campaign. Possibly because of Humphrey and the lack of personal appeal he had to many of the press corps, and the tremendous negative attitude toward the Johnson administration. (Johnson has probably had the worst press relations of any president in modern history.)

One final point: The 1968 press corps was basically full of new faces who were not committed to a previous point of view and were highly impressed by RN's campaign.

Result of analysis: 86 total votes

RN	29
HHH	30
*Undetermined	27
(weighted toward HHH)	

ASSOCIATED PRESS(Vote)

Bell, Jack	Generally fair; old pro.	Hard to determine
Boyarsky, Bill	Liberal Californian. However, impressed with RN. Coverage has been straight.	HHH
Cormier, Frank	Liberal, essentially a water boy like most AP journalists. Reports facts without embellishments. White House correspondent.	HHH
Morin, Pat	Courtly gentleman type. RN knows well. RN all the way.	Bet on RN vote RN vote
Mears, Walter	Good AP reporter. Generally fair.	

BALTIMORE SUN

Ferguson, Pat	One of the originals.	Undetermined RN vote
Nordlinger, Steve	Probable RN vote but not sure. Friendly and fair. Traditional Dem. Had battle with himself but finally arrived at RN conclusion.	

BOOTH NEWSPAPERS

Hoving, Bob	Tremendously friendly in the primaries but liberal type.	HHH I would say
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CHICAGO DAILY NEWS

Lisagor, Peter	Old pro. Generally friendly.	Undetermined
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CHICAGO SUN TIMES

Bartlett, Charles	Has written some favorable stuff but an old Kennedy hand.	HHH
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CHICAGO TRIBUNE

Dombrowski, Lou	Basically friendly, good man, programmed well on release of RN financial position.	RN vote
Edwards, Willard	100% pro RN	RN vote
Kling, Bill	Quite friendly, pro RN	RN vote
Freeberg, Russell	Friendly.	RN vote

CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER

Havel, Bob	Voted Humphrey	HHH
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**(BALTIMORE SUN addition)

Potter, Phil	Strongly anti RN	HHH
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COLUMBUS DISPATCH(Vote)

Embry, George Very friendly, good reporter.
Fed into to Ziegler from
Humphrey camp. RN vote

DETROIT NEWS

Joyce, Tom Neutral. Chance of RN vote

GANNET

Germond, Jack Around long time. Generally
positive attitude. HHH

HEARST

Barnett, David No reading Undetermined

Considine, Bob Told Ziegler flatly thinks RN
a winner and that country needs
an RN victory. Based on this,
voted for RN. RN vote

KANSAS CITY STAR

Cauley, John Pro RN RN vote

KNIGHT NEWSPAPERS

Boyd, Bob Liberal, essentially negative to HHH vote
RN. However, as at Editors meeting,
will credit RN when performance good.
Regular copy is not bad. Tends to
play it straighter than before.

LOS ANGELES TIMES

Donovan, Bob Good newspaperman RN vote

Foley, Tom Good reporter. Would put in
RN column. Undetermined

Irwin, Don Liberal, plays it straight, has
been friendly and helpful within
the corps. RN vote

LIFE

Byers, Marge One of our best friends in the
corps. RN vote

MEMPHIS COMMERCIAL APPEAL(Vote)

Cunningham, Morris Pro RN

RN vote

METROMEDIABlackburn, Dan Lightweight, liberal-ish, straw
in the wind.

HHH

Chamberlayne, Pye Seems friendly

RN vote probably

Christian, Alan Reports good.

Undetermined

Cole, Jack Cocky, arrogant, infectious
among press corps. Goldwater
staff man in 1964.

HHH

MINNEAPOLIS TRIBUNEBailey, Charles Unable to estimate. Liberal,
difficult to judge vote.

Undetermined

NATIONAL OBSERVERDickinson, Jim No solid reading. Observer,
however, basically friendly.

Expect voted HHH

Perry, Jim From outward appearance not pro
RN nor anti RN.

Guess HHH vote

NEW YORK DAILY NEWSGreene, Jerry Friendly, a good ear in the press
corps.

RN vote

Healy, Paul No reading; seems neutral.

Undetermined

NEW YORK POST

Hoffman, Paul Agitator

HHH

Hoge, Warren Has written some good stuff for
an essentially hostile paper.

HHH

NEW YORK TIMESApple, John Liberal, does not lean to RN at all
but young and impressionable. Can
be used to our advantage.

HHH

Bigart, Homer Ultra-liberal, anti RN

HHH

Kenworthy, E. W. Liberal, negative

HHH

NEW YORK TIMES (cont.)(Vote)

Semple, Bob	Liberal reporter. Likes RN and staff.	RN vote
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NEWARK NEWS

Carter, Peter	No reading	Undetermined
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NEWSDAY

Bookbinder, Bernie	Appears friendly. No reading on vote.	Undetermined
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NEWSPAPER ENTERPRISE ASSO.

Biossat, Bruce	Essentially political columnist, has done good stuff for RN. Can be used to RN advantage and has been.	Undetermined
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NEWSWEEK

Alsop, Stewart	Endorsed RN.	Undetermined
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Brumley, Jane	Emotionally committed to RN 100%. Missionary work with others in press corps.	RN vote
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Cannon, Jim Fleming, Karl	Essentially negative. Liberal, unfriendly when came on tour but has come around.	HHH HHH
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PHILADELPHIA BULLETIN

Levy, Paul	Straw in the wind; liberal.	Undetermined
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Daughen, Joe Day, Tony	No reading Very fair, comes from newspaper family.	Undetermined RN vote
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PUBLISHERS HALL SYNDICATE

Kraft, Joe	Liberal intellectual but thinks RN man for the times. His columns on RN enormously helpful with the liberal community.	RN Vote
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PULLIAM NEWSPAPERS

Hiner, Lou	Republican; boozes too much, of little account or use.	RN vote probable
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ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH(Vote)

Childs, Marquis

HHH

Dudman, Dick

Ultra left-winger while seems personally friendly, strongly anti RN.

HHH ~~at - 7-11-64~~SCRIPPS HOWARD

Bassett, Gene

No reading.

Undetermined

Knapp, Ted

Shrewish, anti RN, probably among the 30%.

HHH

TIME

Austin, John

Liberal; however, impressed with RN skill. May, like Fentress, think RN best for national unity at this time. Therefore, perhaps pro RN or neutral.

Undetermined

Lamont, Lansing

In the same league with Kiker.

HHH

Fentress, Sim

Guess HHH vote

WASHINGTON POST

Alsop, Joseph

Hostile, but less so than other years.

HHH ~~at - 7-11-64~~

Broder, David

Liberal, best political reporter on tour perhaps. Writes it straight most of the time and credits RN when performance good. (Stevens Point)

Undetermined

Obordorfer, Don

Liberal type. Prides himself on being investigative reporter. Has written some good & some bad stuff.

HHH

WASHINGTON STAR

Bullen, Dana

Lawyer, covered Supreme Court. Good reporter, checks facts before writing. Basically pro RN in sympathy.

Undetermined

Hope, Paul

Mixed bag; sometimes negative, other times very favorable. Difficult to categorize.

HHH

Johnson, Haynes

No clear reading.

Undetermined

over

Undetermined

ite House.
helpful to
ell of RN.

o staff and pro RN. Undetermined

ng time, old pro. Wrote
able story after covering Undetermi
7 days.

y not political reporter. Undeter
air reports. Undet

ows well. Good reporter
a lot of influence in press
s. I suspect RN vote.

REPORT

Loyal, good supporter.

Generally weak type. Does not
fulfill much of a reporting t
but on our side and therefor
easily used.

CBS(Vote)

Dean, Morton	Filed generally good reports. Hard to determine how voted -- Seemed fair.	Undetermined
Hart, John	Young, aggressive, overly ambitious, impolite, but feel we can work this guy our way.	Undetermined
Plante, Bill	Mixed reports. Probably voted RN.	RN vote.

ABC

Koppel, Ted	Aggressive, trying to get up the ladder, normally fair but definitely not pro RN personally.	HHH
Snell, Dave	Generally not pro RN but leaning our way when he left tour.	Undetermined

MUTUAL

Clarke, Phil	Solid RN	RN vote
Scott, Marvin	Clarke protege.	RN vote

NBC

Kaplow, Herb	This year no question. Position firmed after return from Wallace campaign.	RN vote
Kiker, Douglas	Ranks alongside the worst.	HHH
Valeriani, Dick	Liberal reporter. Sometime agitator.	HHH