

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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April 27, 1974

National Security Decision Memorandum 254

TO:

The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT:

Domestic Safeguards

The President has reviewed the report forwarded on February 15, 1974 on domestic safeguards, as directed by NSSM 120 and the subsequent memorandum of May 4, 1971 for the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

The President has noted the conclusions of the report, and particularly those regarding the needs (1) to weigh the possibilities of sabotage, plutonium contamination threats, and armed attacks (for example, by terrorists) along with the nuclear device threat, (2) to have a continuing process of threat assessment and establishment of appropriate countermeasures, and (3) to maintain fully adequate and essentially equivalent, in terms of quality and extent, safeguards systems in the licensed and license-exempt sectors.

Given the rapid growth of the nuclear power industry and especially the increased availability of plutonium, the President has directed that a priority effort be dedicated to ensuring the adequacy of safeguards systems and, in this regard, that:

- -- Foreseeable improvements both in material control and accounting procedures and in physical protection measures, as mentioned in the report, be implemented on a timely basis in order to provide an improved overall safeguards system.
- -- Full consideration be given the possibilities of utilizing specific measures now in effect for the license-exempt sector in the licensed sector.

In addition, the President has requested that the AEC, in coordination with other agencies as appropriate, submit an annual report on the effectiveness of the safeguards systems, program developments, and

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related recommendations for his consideration. The first report should include, inter alia, an examination of the adequacy of present governmental procedures for responding to a diversion, theft, or sabotage attempt or for a known or suspected diversion. The review should be conducted in cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (The question of U.S. consultations with other countries on safeguards problems is being addressed under the direction of NSDM 235.)

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Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of State

The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff